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PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE 
 
Brian D. Feinstein* 
Daniel J. Hemel** 
 
(forthcoming 118 COLUM. L. REV. __ (2018); Sept. 12, 2017 draft) 
 
Dozens of multimember agencies across the federal government are subject 
to partisan balance requirements, which mandate that no more than a simple 
majority of agency members may hail from a single party. Administrative law 
scholars and political scientists have questioned whether these provisions 
meaningfully affect the ideological composition of federal agencies. In theory, 
Presidents can comply with these requirements by appointing ideologically 
sympathetic members of the opposite party once they have filled their quota of same-
party appointees (i.e., a Democratic President can appoint liberal Republicans or a 
Republican President can appoint conservative Democrats). No multi-agency study 
in the past 50 years, however, has examined whether—in practice—partisan balance 
requirements actually prevent Presidents from selecting likeminded individuals for 
cross-party appointments. 
This article fills that gap. We gather data on 578 appointees to 23 agencies 
over the course of six presidencies and 36 years. We identify the estimated 
ideological preferences of those appointees based on personal campaign 
contributions. We then compare the ideological preferences of co-party and cross-
party appointees across agencies and across presidencies. Our analysis indicates 
that partisan balance requirements had at most a modest impact on the ideological 
composition of multimember agencies from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, but a 
stronger effect from the mid-1990s onward. We then consider several possible 
explanations for these findings. Our results are consistent with a story of “partisan 
sort”: as ideology and party affiliation have become more tightly linked, cross-party 
appointees have become more likely to share the ideological preferences of their co-
partisans rather than those of the appointing President. Our findings suggest that the 
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increasing polarization of political parties is contributing to a concomitant increase 
in the ideological heterogeneity of multimember agencies subject to partisan balance 
mandates.
Sept. 2017 draft] PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE  3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Partisan balance requirements are a common—and controversial—feature of 
federal agency design. These provisions generally mandate that only a bare majority 
of commissioners of a multimember agency can hail from the same political party. 
More than half of all multimember agencies within the federal government are now 
subject to these party balance rules, ranging from little-known entities like the 
African Development Foundation to high-profile agencies such as the Federal 
Communications Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission.1 Yet 
despite the prevalence of partisan balance requirements, scholars of administrative 
law lack even a basic understanding of how these mandates affect the ideological 
composition and policy outputs of multimember agencies. This article sheds light on 
partisan balance requirements and their consequences. 
A number of commentators have expressed doubt as to whether partisan 
balance requirements (PBRs) materially affect the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies. They point out that Presidents can comply with the letter of 
the law simply by selecting an appointee who is nominally registered as a member of 
the opposite party or as an independent, even if that individual is otherwise the 
President’s ideological ally. This view was perhaps most clearly stated in a 1976 
report commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee, which averred that 
neither Republican nor Democrat Presidents had chosen “‘bona fide, honest-to-God’ 
members of the other party” to fill cross-party seats.2   
 Until we can determine empirically whether PBRs meaningfully constrain a 
President’s ability to appoint ideologically sympathetic commissioners to 
multimember agencies, it is difficult to say much about the positive or normative 
implications of these statutory requirements. And yet in the last half century, not a 
single academic article has systematically examined whether and how PBRs affect 
the ideological composition of the agencies to which they apply. One study has 
sought to measure the effect of partisan balance on voting patterns at the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) specifically,3 and a handful of scholars have 
offered anecdotal observations that speak to this question.4 But for the last 
systematic, cross-agency empirical analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideological 
                                                 
1 See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent (and Executive) Agencies, 98 
Cornell L. Rev. 769, 797 tbl.4 (2013). 
2 James M. Graham & Victor H. Kramer, Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: The Federal 
Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, 1949-1974, at 386 (Comm. Print. 
1976) (prepared for the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.). 
3 Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on 
Regulation (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf; 
see also Wenmouth Williams, Jr., Impact of Commissioner Background on FCC Decisions: 1962-
1975, 20 J. Broad. 239, 241 (1976) (providing an earlier look at FCC voting patterns). 
4 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
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composition of agencies, we have to look all the way back to a 1964 study by 
political scientists Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin.5 
 A lot has changed since 1964. Back then, both major political parties were 
ideological “big tents”: the Democratic Party included a staunchly conservative 
Southern base, which found itself to the right of “Rockefeller Republicans” from the 
North on several major issues.6 By the turn of the 21st century, however, partisan 
identity had become a much more reliable predictor of ideology—a phenomenon 
known as “partisan sort.”7 Meanwhile, developments in campaign finance law, 
information technology, and empirical social science have made individual ideology 
much easier to observe. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 for the first 
time required candidates and political parties to disclose the identities of their 
contributors as well as the amounts donated.8 Those records have been open to the 
public in a computer-searchable form since 1980,9 and have been posted on the 
Internet in a searchable format since 1998.10 While an individual’s campaign 
contributions are not a perfect proxy for ideology, recent political science research 
suggests that donations closely track ideological preferences.11 By leveraging 
information on campaign contributions made by individuals across several election 
cycles, researchers can distinguish among liberals, moderates, and conservatives 
within the same political party—both inside and out of government—in a much more 
reliable way than past generations of scholars possibly could. 
 All this means that we are long overdue for a comprehensive, cross-agency 
empirical analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of 
multimember boards and commissions. This article fills that void. Before delving 
                                                 
5 Stuart Nagel & Martin Lubin, Regulatory Commissioners and Party Politics, 17 Admin. L. Rev. 39 
(1964). 
6 See Eric Schickler, Kathryn Pearson, & Brian D. Feinstein, Congressional Parties and Civil Rights 
Politics from 1933 to 1972, 72 J. Pol. 672 (2010) (describing how northern Democrats took the lead 
on advancing civil rights legislation beginning in the 1940s, with Republicans in the middle – offering 
tepid support and occasional behind-the-scenes opposition – and with southern Democrats firmly 
opposed); Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New 
Deal and Fair Deal, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1 (2005) (describing a similar dynamic regarding labor 
issues). 
7 See Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives 
Became Republicans (2009) (defining the term “partisan sort”). 
8 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 14-15, 17, §§ 304, 
308(a)(4). 
9 Telephone Interview with Senior Public Affairs Specialist, Public Records Branch, Federal Election 
Commission (May 30, 2017); accord 49 Fed. Reg. 22335-01 (May 29, 1984) (setting fees for Freedom 
of Information Act requests concerning “computer search[es] of an entire individual contributor file 
for contributions made by a particular individual or individuals”).  
10 Press Release, Federal Election Commission, FEC Launches New Web Info, July 21, 1998, 
available at http://classic.fec.gov/press/press1998/websrch.htm (last visited June 20, 2017). The FEC 
first made available online “comprehensive computer files containing campaign finance information” 
in 1996 and introduced a search function two years later. Id.  
11 See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367 (2014). 
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into the analysis, we consider two explanations as to why limitations on the partisan 
composition of agencies might affect the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies: a supply-side theory and a demand-side theory. (We also consider 
alternative theories that focus on search costs and identity signaling.) The supply-
side theory posits that there is only a small pool of liberal Republicans and 
conservative Democrats who are potentially qualified to serve as commissioners, and 
so Presidents looking for competent cross-party appointees whose ideological 
preferences track their own will often find themselves out of luck. Thus, Presidents 
who are required by PBRs to make cross-party appointments to multimember 
agencies will be compelled by supply-side constraints to choose a genuine cross-
partisan. Whereas the supply-side theory focuses on the first stage of the 
appointment process (the selection of a nominee), the demand-side theory focuses on 
the end stage: confirmation. The demand-side theory emphasizes that nominees to 
federal agencies ultimately must be “sold” to the Senate, since a majority vote of the 
Senate is necessary for confirmation. On this view, consumers in the confirmation 
market (i.e., senators) demand cross-party appointees who are bona fide members of 
that party, and thus force the President to choose commissioners from the other side 
of the ideological spectrum. 
 The supply-side and demand-side theories both suggest that PBRs will affect 
the ideological composition of multimember agencies, but they generate different 
predictions as to when and why. If the supply-side theory is correct, then we would 
expect to see the effect of PBRs growing over time in tandem with partisan sort. If 
the demand-side theory is correct, then we would expect to see the effect of PBRs 
most strongly in periods of divided government, when the opposition party in the 
Senate has leverage to force the President’s hand.  
To assess the effect of PBRs and test these and other theories, we gather data 
on the identities of 578 appointees to twenty-three agencies over the course of six 
presidencies and thirty-six years (1979 through 2014). We then use data on those 
individuals’ campaign contributions to estimate their ideological preferences. We 
compare the (estimated) ideological preferences of appointees to those of their 
appointing Presidents, and we compare co-party appointees (i.e., a Democrat 
appointed by a Democratic President or a Republican appointed by a Republican 
President) to cross-party appointees (i.e., a Republican appointed by a Democratic 
President or vice-versa). We show how the effects of PBRs on the ideological 
composition of federal agencies vary over time and with changes in control of 
Congress. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that partisan balance 
requirements do “bite.” When Presidents are required by law to make cross-party 
appointments, they generally choose “bona fide, honest-to-God” members of the 
opposite party—or, at least, individuals whose observed ideologies are significantly 
different than the President’s own. Looking at the 36-year period overall, Republican 
Presidents appoint Democrats who are more liberal than themselves and more liberal 
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than their Republican co-party appointees. Likewise, Democratic Presidents appoint 
Republicans who are more conservative than themselves and than their Democratic 
co-party appointees.  
 Second, the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies is much more pronounced today than it was at the beginning of our study 
period. This finding is consistent with the supply-side theory and our expectations 
based on partisan sort. President Jimmy Carter often named relatively moderate 
Republicans as cross-party appointees; Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. 
Bush often appointed centrist or conservative Democrats. By the time of President 
Bill Clinton, however, this phenomenon had subsided. Republicans appointed by 
Presidents Clinton and Barack Obama tended to be quite conservative, and 
Democrats appointed by President George W. Bush tended to be quite liberal.  
 Third, we find no apparent relationship between the presence or absence of 
divided government and the ideological distance between the President and cross-
party appointees. This finding is at odds with the demand-side theory, which would 
lead us to expect the effect to be most pronounced when the White House and the 
Senate are controlled by different parties. While we do not dismiss the demand-side 
explanation entirely, our analysis suggests that supply-side factors do more to 
mediate the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies.  
 We conclude by considering the implications of our empirical analysis for the 
scholarly understanding of PBRs. We identify three main accounts of partisan 
balance requirements in the administrative law literature. One account, which pulls 
insights from political science, posits that PBRs reduce the costs borne by Congress 
in monitoring agency actions (the monitoring account). On this view, PBRs ensure 
that agencies include members whose policy preferences diverge from the sitting 
President’s, and these minority members will alert lawmakers if members from the 
President’s party stray from legislators’ preferences.12 A second account, drawing on 
the social psychology literature, suggests that PBRs can improve agencies’ 
deliberative processes by offsetting tendencies toward group polarization (the 
deliberative account).13 According to this view, PBRs ensure that multimember 
agencies include a diverse set of perspectives, thereby counterbalancing tendencies 
toward group polarization. Apart from any effect on the cost of congressional 
monitoring, this account suggests that PBRs can improve federal administration by 
raising the quality of agency decisionmaking.14 A third account, rooted in 
constitutional law scholarship on the “unitary executive,” posits that PBRs obstruct 
the President in the execution of her constitutional responsibilities (the obstruction 
                                                 
12 See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
13 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71, 74 
(2000) (defining group polarization as involving “members of a deliberating group predictably 
mov[ing] toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation 
tendencies”). 
14 See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
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account).15 According to this view, PBRs “quite literally force Presidents to rely on 
their political enemies to carry out their executive duties,”16 and thus potentially 
prevent Presidents from implementing their policy agendas.17  
These three accounts are not mutually exclusive: in theory, PBRs could 
reduce the cost to Congress of monitoring multimember agencies, counterbalance 
tendencies toward group polarization within agencies, and force Presidents to rely on 
their political enemies. Moreover, these three perspectives on PBRs all rest on the 
same empirical premise: that PBRs actually operate as meaningful constraints on the 
President’s ability to appoint commissioners who share her ideology and policy 
preferences. Our findings shore up that empirical premise, though they fall short of 
confirming the more ambitious claims that each account makes. Our analysis also 
indicates that the effects of PBRs on the operation of multimember agencies are 
potentially quite different today than they were three decades ago, when PBRs had a 
less dramatic effect on ideological composition. This finding suggests that 
conclusions regarding PBRs drawn from the period before partisan sort should be 
reassessed anew. Finally, and perhaps counterintuitively, we suggest that for those 
who are concerned about presidential control over multimember agencies, the fact 
that PBRs are relatively effective actually makes them less threatening to the sitting 
President. We explain our rationale for this counterintuitive conclusion at greater 
length below.18 
  For the optimist, our results might suggest that there is an unexpected upside 
to partisan sort: as the parties become less ideologically diverse, multimember 
agencies become more so. While the phenomenon of partisan sort has fueled 
concerns about group polarization in government institutions,19 our results suggest 
that the combination of partisan sort and partisan balance requirements improves the 
prospects for ideological diversity within multimember agencies. We caution, 
though, that sweeping normative conclusions are premature: our study addresses the 
effect of PBRs on the ideological diversity of multimember agencies, not the effect 
of ideological diversity on agency functioning. We cannot yet claim that PBRs are 
                                                 
15 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Johnjerica Hodge, and Wesley W. Wintermyer, Partisan Balance 
Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 941 (2015). 
16 Id. at 991. 
17 Id. at 995. 
18 In brief, PBRs ensure that Presidents inherit commissions with only a bare majority of members 
from the opposition party. For a commission with fixed terms for appointees and a PBR, this means 
that in expectation, it will take less time for a new President to “flip” the commission to include a 
majority of her party’s members than it would for an otherwise identical multimember commission 
with a fixed-term provision and no PBR. 
19 See David A. Jones, The Polarizing Effect of a Partisan Workplace, 46 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 67 
(2013) (reporting evidence of group polarization at federal and other inside-the-Beltway workplaces); 
see also James B. Stewart, Case Study in Chaos: How Management Experts Grade a Trump White 
House, N.Y. Times (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/donald-trump-
management-style.html (reporting management expert’s concerns regarding “group think” in Trump 
administration). 
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desirable because ideologically diverse agencies function better than agencies with 
monolithic memberships. What we can say is that for such a claim to be true, it must 
first be true that PBRs actually lead to more ideologically diverse agencies, and our 
results strongly affirm that first premise. 
 While our study is primarily backward-looking, our findings have clear 
implications going forward for the evaluation of cross-party appointments under 
President Trump and subsequent administrations. Without knowing whether past 
Presidents have named genuine cross-partisans to PBR agencies, it is difficult to 
determine whether a new White House occupant is acting consistent with established 
norms. So far, President Trump has been slow to fill vacancies on PBR agencies—
though especially slow to make cross-party nominations. As of this writing, 
President Trump had nominated thirty-one individuals to positions on the twenty-
three boards and commissions with statutory or informal PBRs that we consider 
here,20 only five of whom were cross-party appointments. Notably, the five 
Democrats nominated by President Trump to cross-party seats on PBR agencies all 
have strong Democratic credentials.21 At the same time, a President potentially can 
                                                 
20 See Tracking How Many Key Positions Trump Has Filled So Far, Wash. Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-administration-appointee-tracker/database 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
21 Jessica Rosenworcel, a Trump appointee to the FCC, is a former Senate Democratic staffer who 
was appointed by President Obama to a Democratic seat on the commission and contributed $2,700 to 
Hillary Clinton during the 2016 campaign. See Biography of Former Commissioner Jessica 
Rosenworcel, Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, https://www.fcc.gov/biography-former-commissioner-
jessica-rosenworcel (last updated Jan. 4, 2017); Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-lookup/results?name=Jessica+Rosenworcel (last visited July 10, 
2017) (search results for “Jessica Rosenworcel”). Jason Kearns, a Trump appointee to be chairman of 
the U.S. International Trade Commission, is a former House Democratic staffer who donated $1,000 
to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential bid and who was previously nominated by President Obama to 
that post. See Press Release, Ways & Means Comm. Democrats, U.S. House of Representatives, Neal, 
Levin Statements on Nomination of Jason Kearns for International Trade Commission (Jan. 18, 
2017), https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/neal-levin-statements-
nomination-jason-kearns-international-trade; Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-lookup/results?name=Jason+Kearns (last visited July 10, 2017) 
(search results for “Jason Kearns”). Rostin Behnam, a Trump appointee to the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, was an aide to Democratic Senator Debbie Stabenow of Michigan and donated 
a total of $5,150 to Hillary Clinton during the primary and general election campaigns. See Gabriel T. 
Rubin & Andrew Ackerman, White House to Nominate Russ Behnam as CFTC Commissioner, Wall 
St. J. (July 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-to-nominate-russ-behnam-as-cftc-
commissioner-1499889964; Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-
lookup/results?name=rostin+behnam (last visited July 16, 2017) (search results for “Rostin 
Behnam”). Richard Glick, a Trump nominee to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is a 
Democratic Senate aide with a long record of donations to Democratic candidates. See Robert 
Walton, Trump To Nominate Democratic Senate Aid Richard Glick to FERC, Utility Dive (June 29, 
2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/trump-to-nominate-democratic-senate-aide-richard-glick-to-
ferc/446151; Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-
lookup/results?name=richard+glick (last visited Aug. 10, 2017) (search results for “Richard Glick”). 
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skew the composition of PBR agencies by quickly making co-party appointments 
while stalling on cross-party nominations.22 It is premature to say whether the Trump 
administration is pursuing such a strategy. What we can say is that by documenting 
past practices regarding appointments to PBR agencies, our study establishes a 
baseline that can facilitate future comparative evaluations.  
Our article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on PBRs, 
reviews the existing literature on these requirements, and considers causal pathways 
by which these requirements might affect the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies. Part II describes our data and methodology and presents our 
main empirical results. Part III discusses the implications of our results and identifies 
areas for future research. 
 
I.  PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND EXISTING EVIDENCE 
 
 This first Part provides an overview of partisan balance requirements in 
agency organic statutes and considers reasons why these requirements might (or 
might not) affect the ideological makeup of boards and commissions. Section I.A 
briefly summarizes the history of partisan balance requirements. Section I.B surveys 
the literature on the efficacy of partisan balance requirements. Section I.C considers 
causal pathways through which PBRs might operate and explains how these different 
causal stories can be disentangled. 
 
A.  A Short History of Partisan Balance Requirements 
 
Partisan balance requirements for federal agencies date at least as far back as 
the Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882.23 The Act prohibited polygamists from 
voting or running in Utah elections. A new Utah Commission was tasked with 
                                                                                                                                          
And Jeff Baran, a Democratic member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who was renominated 
by President Trump, is also a former Democratic congressional aide who was initially appointed by 
President Obama and who made contributions to both the Obama and Hillary Clinton presidential 
campaigns. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald J. Trump 
Announces Intent to Nominate Personnel to Key Administration Posts (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/president-donald-j-trump-announces-intent-
nominate-personnel-key; Commissioner Jeff Baran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commission/baran.html (last updated Sept. 5, 2017); 
Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-lookup/results?name=jeff+baran 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (search results for “Jeff Baran”).  
22 Bloomberg News observed in June 2017 that President Trump “has been aggressive in moving to 
fill open Republican seats at the CFTC” but “hasn’t yet tapped any Democrats to join the CFTC.” 
Benjamin Bain, Lone Democrat on U.S. Swaps Regulator to Leave Before Term Ends, Bloomberg 
(June 20, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-20/lone-democrat-on-u-s-swaps-
regulator-to-leave-before-term-ends. Several weeks later, President Trump nominated a Democrat to 
the commission. See Rubin & Ackerman, supra note 21. 
23 Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882); see Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 964. 
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enforcing the anti-polygamy requirements. Section 9 of the Act stated that the board 
should consist of “five persons, to be appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of 
one political party.”24 Similar PBRs appeared in several more 19th century statutes, 
including the Pendleton Act of 1883, which created the Civil Service Commission;25 
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,26 which created the Interstate Commerce 
Commission; and an 1890 law establishing a nine-member board of general 
appraisers that would ascertain the value of merchandise for customs purposes.27 
Congress also included PBRs in a number of statutes creating commissions to 
negotiate treaties with Indian tribes at the century’s end.28 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the 1880s also saw a national movement for civil service reform, and 
these first PBRs limited the President’s ability to adopt a “to the victor go the spoils” 
posture in appointments.29 Yet these first few PBRs do not appear to have elicited 
much discussion in the House or in the Senate, and—speculation aside—the initial 
reason for their insertion remains obscure.30 
The presidency of Woodrow Wilson brought with it the next golden age of 
PBRs. Wilson’s first term saw the creation of five major multimember agencies with 
PBRs in their organic statutes: the Federal Trade Commission,31 the Federal Farm 
Loan Board,32 the U.S. Shipping Board,33 the U.S. Employees’ Compensation 
Commission,34 and the United States Tariff Commission.35 At the time, senators 
suggested that PBRs would make agencies less prone to partisan bias and more likely 
to act on the basis of expertise—though precisely how PBRs might produce these 
results remained unspecified.36 
The creation of new agencies with PBRs in their organic statutes has 
continued ever since. In the last century, Congress has established at least 40 bodies 
subject to PBRs.37 Most of these statutes provide for an odd number of members, no 
                                                 
24 Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 9, 22 Stat. at 32 (emphasis added). 
25 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403; see Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 966. 
26 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
27 Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136. 
28 See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 412, § 14, 25 Stat. 980, 1005; Act of Aug. 19, 1890, ch. 807, 26 Stat. 
336, 354; Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164, 27 Stat. 120, 138, 139; Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 
321, 342. Justice Brandeis documents the early history of PBRs in his dissent in Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 270 n.51 (1926). 
29 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 Yale 
L.J. 1362, 1389 (2010). 
30 See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 964-65, 967. 
31 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717. 
32 Act of July 17, 1916, ch. 245, § 3, 39 Stat. 360. 
33 Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 451, § 3, 39 Stat. 728, 729. 
34 Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, § 28, 39 Stat. 742, 748. 
35 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795. 
36 See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 969--70. 
37 See id. at 1009-1017 tbls.1--3. 
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more than a bare majority of whom may be from the same political party. The 
organic statutes of a small handful of agencies (most significantly, the Federal 
Election Commission) provide for an even number of members, with no more than 
half from the same party.38 
Significantly, the PBR provisions in agency organic statutes do not 
technically require a Democratic President to appoint Republicans or a Republican 
President to appoint Democrats. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s organic statute states that “not more than three [of the five 
commissioners] shall be members of the same political party.”39 Thus, a Republican 
President could appoint three Republican commissioners and two independents (or, 
for that matter, two Libertarians), rather than naming two Democrats. In practice, 
though, we see very few cases of Presidents naming independents to cross-party 
posts on PBR agencies. Indeed, in our review of 216 cross-party appointments to 23 
PBR agencies over the 1979-2014 time period, we have identified only seven cases 
in which a President named an independent at a time when a PBR prohibited him 
from appointing a member of his own party to an agency. 
 These seven cases, moreover, do not suggest a pattern of Presidents 
attempting to manipulate PBRs by filling cross-party seats with likeminded 
independents. Three of the seven cases involved a Democratic President filling a 
cross-party seat with an appointee who, though registered as an independent, had 
previously worked as an aide to a Republican senator.40 Two more involved 
Republican Presidents filling cross-party seats with independents who would later be 
chosen by Democratic Presidents for positions to which the Democratic President 
could have named a Democrat—an indication that the individual, though registered 
as an independent, was generally aligned with the Democratic Party.41 One case 
                                                 
38 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 1, 90 Stat. 475, 
475 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1)). Other extant agencies with an even number of 
members and a requirement that no more than half hail from the same party include the International 
Trade Commission, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a), and the Election Assistance Commission, 52 U.S.C. § 
20923. 
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a). 
40 The three are: Don Zimmerman, appointed by President Carter to the NLRB in 1980; Reginald 
Jones, appointed by President Clinton to the EEOC in 1996; and Jackie Clegg, appointed by Clinton 
to the Export-Import Bank in 1997. See James A. Gross, Broken Promise: The Subversion of U.S. 
Labor Relations Policy, 1947-1994, at 245-46 (1995) (noting that Zimmerman had served as an 
adviser to Republican Senator Jacob Javits of New York); Lee Davidson, Utah Nominee Gets High 
Marks, Deseret News (Salt Lake City) (May 23, 1997) (noting that Clegg had served as an aide to 
Republican Senator Jake Garn of Utah); Press Release, White House, President Clinton Names 
Reginald Jones to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (June 5, 1996) (noting that Jones 
was at the time senior legislative counsel to Republican Senator James Jeffords of Vermont). 
41 The two are: Mary Schapiro, appointed by President Reagan to the SEC in 1988 and reappointed by 
President George H.W. Bush in 1989; and Thomas Curry, appointed to the FDIC by President George 
W. Bush in 2003. See Vicky Stamas, President to Nominate Reum to Fill Position Remaining at the 
SEC, Bond Buyer, Aug. 21, 1992, at 5 (noting that Schapiro was independent in cross-party seat); 
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Clinton Expected to Name S.E.C. Member to Head C.F.T.C., N.Y. Times 
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involved President Clinton appointing an independent to the National Transportation 
Safety Board who had been recommended by the Board’s outgoing Republican 
member.42 Indeed, in only one case did we find any record of complaints that the 
President had appointed an independent rather than a member of the opposite party 
to fill a cross-party seat. 43 
The only agency at which Presidents have repeatedly sought to fill cross-
party seats with ideologically sympathetic independents is—perhaps surprisingly—
an agency with no regulatory authority: the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.44 (We 
exclude the Commission on Civil Rights from our dataset because of its lack of 
authority to bind others through regulation, adjudication, or enforcement, as well as 
the fact that half of its members are chosen by Congress rather than the President and 
its members generally serve part-time.45) The commission’s organic statute states 
that “[n]ot more than 4 of the [8] members shall at any one time be of the same 
                                                                                                                                          
(May 3, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/03/business/clinton-expected-to-name-sec-member-
to-head-cftc.html (reporting that President Clinton would name Schapiro to chair CFTC at time when 
commission already had two Republican members, and so Clinton could have named a fellow 
Democrat); Kathleen Pender, Mary Schapiro’s Mixed Marks as SEC Head, S.F. Chron. (Nov. 26, 
2012), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Mary-Schapiro-s-mixed-marks-as-SEC-head-
4068463.php (noting that Schapiro, named by President Obama in 2009 to chair the SEC, served with 
two Republicans, meaning that Obama could have named a third registered Democrat instead of 
Schapiro);  Hannah Bergman, FDIC Board Is Factor in OCC Choice, Am. Banker, Jan. 12, 2005, at 1 
(noting that Thomas Curry was an independent named by President George W. Bush to a cross-party 
seat); Binyamin Appelbaum, Official From F.D.I.C. Picked To Lead Banking Regulator, N.Y. Times 
(July 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/business/02currency.html (noting President 
Obama’s nomination of Curry to be Comptroller of the Currency, a position not subject to a PBR). 
42 This was John Goglia, appointed by President Clinton to the NTSB in 1995 and reappointed in 
1999. See Matthew Brelis, US Transportation Appointee Brings Hands-On View; 29 Years as Air 
Mechanic Won Spot for Saugus Man, Bos. Globe, Oct. 10, 1995, at 18. 
43 This was Mary Azcuenaga, named by President Reagan to the FTC in 1984. Her appointment 
generated grumbling from one Democratic senator, who “wondered why Mr. Reagan, if he wants to 
appoint independents, cannot pick them for Republican seats.” Robert D. Hershey Jr., Washington 
Watch: No Democrats Seen for F.T.C., N.Y. Times (Oct. 28, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/28/business/washington-watch-no-democrats-seen-for-ftc.html 
(paraphrasing Senator Wendell Ford, Democrat of Kentucky). However, Azcuenaga was also 
reportedly viewed favorably by the outgoing Democratic commissioner whom she replaced. See 
Thomas Ferraro, Reagan Expected To Name Woman To Replace FTC’s Pertschuk, UPI (Aug. 14, 
1984), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/08/14/Reagan-expected-to-name-woman-to-replace-FTCs-
Pertschuk/9862461304000 (quoting aide to outgoing Democratic commissioner who said that the 
commissioner “respects” Azcuenaga and was “relatively pleased” that she would be his successor). 
44 See Charlie Savage, Manuever Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel, Bos. Globe (Nov. 6, 2007), 
http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/11/06/maneuver_gave_bush_a_ 
conservative_rights_panel (“Especially since the 1980s, presidents and lawmakers have tried to tilt the 
panel by appointing independents who shared their party's views on civil rights.”). 
45 Of the commission’s eight members, four are appointed by the President, two are appointed by the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the recommendation of the Senate Majority and Minority 
Leaders, and two are appointed by the Speaker of the House on the recommendation of the House 
Majority and Minority Leaders. 42 U.S.C. § 1974(b). 
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political party.”46 The meaning of this provision was tested in 2003 and 2004, when 
two Republican members of the commission changed their registration to 
independent.47 Their switches allowed President George W. Bush to name two 
additional Republicans to the commission, bringing the number of Republican or 
recently-Republican members of the panel to six.48 At the time, the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the Justice Department issued an opinion stating that, for purposes of the 
statutory PBR, “the relevant consideration is the party affiliation of the other 
members at the time the new member is appointed.”49 In the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s view, application of the statutory PBR did not require looking beyond 
party registration to determine the partisan identity of a prospective or current 
commissioner. 
 Aside from the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion, there is very little legal 
precedent regarding the interpretation or application of partisan balance requirements 
in agency organic statutes. The constitutionality of PBRs has been challenged in two 
cases, but the courts did not reach the merits of the constitutional issue in either case.  
In Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund, the National Rifle 
Association’s political action committee argued that the provision in the six-member 
Federal Election Commission’s organic statute capping the number of 
commissioners from any political party at three violated the President’s appointment 
power.50 The D.C. Circuit rejected the argument on standing grounds, reasoning that 
“it is impossible to determine in this case whether the statute actually limited the 
President’s appointment power” because it was not clear that the President otherwise 
would have sought to appoint more than three commissioners from his own party.51 
In National Committee of the Reform Party v. Democratic National Committee, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the Federal Election Commission’s partisan 
balance requirement on similar grounds, emphasizing that “without the statute the 
President could have appointed exactly the same members.”52  
We know of no case in which a litigant has sought judicial enforcement of a 
PBR—i.e., has argued for the invalidation of an agency action on the grounds that a 
commission had too many members of the same party. At the same time, we have 
found no reported instances of outright PBR violations—no case, that is, where a 
President has sought to exceed the statutory cap on commissioners from a single 
party. The letter, if not the spirit, of PBRs is followed uniformly. But to say that 
PBRs are followed as a technical matter does not explain what substantive effects 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 See Savage, supra note 44. 
48 Id. 
49 Political Balance Requirement for the Civil Rights Commission, 28 Op. O.L.C. 295 , 295 (Dec. 6, 
2004). 
50 6 F.3d 821, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
51 Id. 
52 168 F.3d 360, 365 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 825) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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these provisions have. The following section turns to that question and surveys the 
scant scholarly literature that exists to date. 
 
B.  Do Partisan Balance Requirements Bite? 
 
 Our central aim is to test the hypothesis that partisan balance requirements 
affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies. A contrary view posits 
that cross-party commissioners “come in sheep’s clothing” and do not differ from a 
President’s co-party appointees in any way other than the superficial fact of party 
registration.53 One scholar has noted the example of Ray Wakefield, a nominally 
Republican but questionably conservative Roosevelt nominee to the FCC.54 Timothy 
Nokken and Brian Sala cite examples from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and 
Carter administrations.55 An especially notorious example from the Nixon 
administration is that of James Quello, a nominally cross-party appointee to the FCC 
who—despite his Democratic affiliation—donated $1,100 to Nixon’s reelection 
effort in 1972.56 A report commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee and 
completed at the end of the Ford presidency concluded that cross-party appointees 
“typically” support the President who selected them.57 Alan Morrison observed at the 
end of the Reagan years that the outgoing President had “largely succeeded” in 
“placing in all agencies, independent and otherwise, those who believe firmly in the 
Reagan view of government—Democrats as well as Republicans.”58 And Senator 
                                                 
53 See Ho, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2--3) (collecting sources that make this claim). 
54 Lawrence W. Lichty, Members of the Federal Radio Commission and Federal Communications 
Commission 1927-1961, 6 J. Broad. 23, 25 (1961); accord Wenmouth Williams, Jr., Impact of 
Commissioner Background on FCC Decisions: 1962-1975, 20 J. Broad. 239, 241 (1976) (concluding 
that “party affiliation has not been a reliable predictor of voting” on the FCC). 
55 Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential 
Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. Theoretical Pol. 91, 95 (2000). In particular, Nokken 
and Sala note that President Eisenhower appointed two nominally Democratic FTC commissioners 
whose ideological loyalties were suspect: Robert Secrest, a conservative Democratic Congressman 
from Ohio, and William Kern, previously an FTC staff member “whose principal Democratic 
credentials were that his father had been William Jennings Bryan’s running mate in 1908.” Nokken 
and Sala add that “Kennedy and Nixon adopted similar appointment strategies by appointing liberal 
‘Lindsay Republicans’ and conservative ‘Connally Democrats,’ respectively.” And they further 
mention the case of Frank Reiche, one of President Carter’s cross-party appointees to the FEC, whom 
some Republican senators opposed because he was not sufficiently conservative. Id. at 95 & n.6; see 
also Princeton Attorney Confirmed to Post on Election Panel, Ashbury Park (N.J.) Press, July 26, 
1979, at 62 (noting that 21 out of 41 Republican senators voted against Reiche, with some 
conservative Republicans saying that he did not represent their views). 
56 See Graham & Kramer, supra note 2, at 357-367. 
57 Id. at 366. 
58 Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory Agencies?, 1988 Duke L.J. 252, 
253-54. 
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Bob Dole once accused President Clinton of appointing “Clinton Republicans” to 
cross-party seats.59 
 We know of only one study other than our own that undertakes a quantitative 
cross-commission analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies: the 1964 study by Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin referenced 
above. Nagel and Lubin focus on seven commissions: the now-defunct Civil 
Aeronautics Board and Interstate Commerce Commission, the FCC, the Federal 
Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), the NLRB, 
and the SEC. They draw data from three years each spaced a decade apart: 1936, 
1946, and 1956.60 They consider a decision to be “liberal” if it goes “in favor of the 
consumer, shipper, or investor (rather than the seller, producer, transporter, or 
broker), in favor of labor (rather than management), in favor of a small business or 
increased competition (rather than a larger firm or decreased competition).”61 They 
report whether commissioner are above or below their agencies’ average liberalism 
score. On this dimension, Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents are most 
likely to be above their agency’s average liberalism score (64%), followed by 
Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents (54%), followed by Republicans 
appointed by Democratic Presidents (46%), followed by Republicans appointed by 
Republican Presidents (33%).62 The findings are reported in a way that makes it 
impossible to determine just how much PBRs affect voting behavior, though the 
results seem to suggest that PBRs lead Republican Presidents to choose somewhat 
more liberal commissioners and lead Democratic Presidents to select somewhat more 
conservative appointees. 
 While these results are suggestive, Nagel and Lubin’s method of categorizing 
decisions as “liberal” and “conservative” is certainly vulnerable to critique. First, the 
terms “liberal” and “conservative” are not easy to operationalize—and any attempt to 
do so inevitably imports biases. (Why do we think liberals are more likely to favor 
“increased competition,” and how should we code cases where the competitive 
consequences are hotly disputed?) Second, the types of cases that will reach an 
adjudicatory commission may vary with the commission’s ideological 
composition—the administrative law version of the Priest-Klein effect familiar from 
the civil procedure literature.63 Individual workers and labor unions may be more 
likely to bring ambitious cases to the NLRB when they know that the board has a 
                                                 
59 Al Kamen, Who’s Republican? And Who’s to Decide?, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 1993), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/06/whos-republican-and-whos-to-
decide/8a85544f-f1a1-4558-ac1f-5c498e5609e6/?utm_term=.a10e33cb8cfe. 
60 Nagel & Lubin, supra note 5 at 39. 
61 Id. at 40 
62 Id. at 42 tbl.1. 
63 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud.  
1 (1984) (suggesting that the disputes that reach litigation are ones in which each party has close to a 
50% probability of victory). 
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liberal majority; likewise for employers when they know that the board tilts toward 
the right.  
 Daniel Ho’s methodologically rigorous study of voting patterns among FCC 
commissioners addresses the first of these two aforementioned imperfections of the 
Nagel and Lubin study. Ho pioneers an approach—a Bayesian multilevel ideal point 
model of mixed ordinal votes—to map votes onto a unidimensional spectrum 
without requiring researchers to decide which positions are “liberal” and which ones 
are “conservative.”64 As Ho summarizes, his analysis of the FCC suggests that most 
cross-party appointees are “genuine”: with a small number of exceptions, “[c]ross-
party appointees don’t don sheep’s clothing.”65 In other words, Democratic 
commissioners appointed by Republican Presidents to satisfy the statutory PBR 
appear to be relatively liberal, and Republican commissioners appointed by 
Democratic Presidents to satisfy the statutory PBR appear to be relatively 
conservative. Somewhat surprisingly, the most conservative commissioner according 
to Ho’s estimates is a Republican appointed by Democratic President Clinton, and 
the three most liberal commissioners are Democrats appointed by Republican 
Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush.66 
 Ho’s study of the FCC provides us with extraordinarily useful insights 
regarding voting behavior at a single agency. But while Ho’s single-agency analysis 
suggests that partisan balance requirements do “bite,” it is not clear whether his 
FCC-specific results are generalizable to other multimember agencies.67 
Unfortunately, Ho’s innovative method cannot be applied broadly beyond the FCC: 
his method relies on having a large set of non-unanimous commission votes to 
analyze, but at many multimember agencies—including the Federal Election 
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and 
Securities and Exchange Commission—dissents and concurrences are rare.68 For this 
reason, we look to other data sources and methodological approaches in order to 
assess the cross-agency effects of PBRs. 
                                                 
64 Ho, supra note 3. 
65 Id. (manuscript at 19, 24). 
66 Id. (manuscript at 21 fig.4). 
67 The FCC is, by many accounts, a particularly politicized agency. See Benjamin Kapnik, Affirming 
the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency Adjudications, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1527, 1528 
(2012) (“The FCC has long been considered a politicized agency . . . .”); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional 
Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 675, 689 
(2009) (noting “super-politicized” environment at FCC). Cf. Kimberly A. Zarkin & Michael J. Zarkin, 
The Federal Communications Commission: Front Line in the Culture and Regulation Wars 49 (2006) 
(“[T]he FCC is an organization that is particularly open to interference by outside forces.”). While 
these characterizations are difficult to verify, they cast doubt on the external validity of FCC-specific 
findings. 
68 See id. (manuscript at 8 tbl.1) (showing that the number of dissents and concurrences per 
commissioner is 172 for the FCC, compared to 4 for the FEC, 12 for the FTC, 3 for the NRC, and 6 
for the SEC). 
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 Ho’s study also does not seek to determine why PBRs might be effective. The 
next Section turns to that question and sets forth two theories with testable 
implications that might explain the efficacy of these provisions. In Part II, we go on 
to consider whether PBRs do in fact affect the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies, and we assess the evidence in support of our two separate 
theories. 
 
C.  Why Might Partisan Balance Requirements Bite? 
 
 We focus here on two causal mechanisms that might explain why PBRs 
affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies: a supply-side theory 
and a demand-side theory. In the “market” for commissioners, the President draws 
from a limited supply of individuals with the experience and expertise to serve 
competently on multimember federal agencies. The President then must “sell” his 
nominee to sometimes-skeptical senators—the consumers in our market metaphor. If 
PBRs do indeed affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies, it may 
be due to supply-side constraints, or demand-side constraints, or both. 
 
 1.  The Supply-Side Theory  
 
The supply-side theory holds that the President selects from a pool of 
potential cross-party appointees that is dominated by individuals whose ideological 
preferences differ from the President’s own. Consider the challenge facing a 
Democratic President who is filling a seat on the five-member FCC at a time when 
the FCC already has three Democratic members (its maximum number of same-party 
commissioners). Presumably the President cares at least somewhat about the 
competence of commissioners, and so desires an appointee with relevant experience 
in communications law or policy. The pool of individuals who have such experience 
and who are not members of the Democratic Party will be weighted toward 
moderates and conservatives. While it might not be impossible for the Democratic 
President to find a liberal non-Democrat who also has relevant qualifications for the 
commissionership, it is—at the very least—easier for a Democratic President to draw 
liberals from within the President’s own party than from without. 
 The plausibility of the supply-side theory depends on the strength of the 
relationship between partisanship and ideology. If the Republican Party includes 
large pools of liberals as well as conservatives, then a Democratic President making 
a cross-party appointment can satisfy the PBR by selecting a relatively liberal 
Republican. Partisan sort, however, undermines the ability of Democratic Presidents 
to find ideologically sympathetic Republicans to fill posts on multimember agencies 
(and likewise for Republican Presidents seeking out ideologically sympathetic 
Democrats).  
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 The political science literature on partisan sort distinguishes between “elite 
polarization” and “mass polarization.” By “elites” (or alternatively, the “political 
class”), we refer to public officials, interest group leaders, activists, substantial 
donors, and political commentators.69 While the extent to which mass polarization 
has occurred is contested,70 there is close to a consensus that elites have become 
more polarized over the course of the past several decades.71 Because appointees to 
multimember agencies are generally drawn from the “political class,”72 elite 
polarization rather than mass polarization is the more relevant phenomenon for our 
purposes. By most measures, the partisan sorting of elites accelerated in the mid- to 
late-1970s and has continued to pick up steam ever since.73 On most accounts, the 
partisan realignment of the South—with white conservative Democrats moving to 
the Republican Party—was an important but nonexclusive factor contributing to 
partisan sort.74 Whatever the causes, few scholars would dispute that ideology is a 
stronger predictor of partisan affiliation today than it was 25 to 35 years ago.75 
                                                 
69 See Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class versus the 
People, in I Red and Blue Nation?: Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Parties 50 
(Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006). 
70 Compare Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate, 
60 J. Pol. 634, 649 (1998) (“The increasing ideological polarization of the Democratic and Republican 
Parties in the Reagan and post-Reagan eras made it easier for voters to recognize the differences 
between the parties’ policy stands. As a result, voters have been choosing their party identification on 
the basis of their policy preferences rather than maintaining the party allegiance that they inherited 
from their parents.”), with Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope, Polarization in 
the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings, 70 J. Pol. 556, 558 (2008) (stating that “party 
sorting has proceeded much less in the general public than among party elites”). 
71 See Fiorina et al., supra note 70, at 557 (“There is general agreement that party elites have become 
significantly more distinct over the course of the past several decades . . . .”).  
72 See supra note 107 (comparing the propensity of PBR appointees to contribute to political 
candidates to the propensities of Obama appointees, Fortune 500 CEOs, former Supreme Court clerks 
to do so). 
73 See, e.g., Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 
46 Polity 411, 415 (2014) (observing— on the basis of voting patterns among members of the House 
and Senate—that “the parties began to diverge in the mid-1970s and this trend has continued unabated 
into the most recent Congress”); Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Polarization: The Role of 
Elite Polarization, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 619, 622-23 (2001) (observing—also on the basis of 
congressional voting patterns—that polarization reached a “trough” in the mid-1970s but began a 
“steady rise” starting with the Carter years, and a “second spike” in the last two years of George H.W. 
Bush’s presidency). 
74 See Hare & Poole, supra note 73, at 417 (“[T]he southern realignment does not fully account for the 
increase in polarization. The Republican Party became much more conservative across all regions of 
the United States.”); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background 
Paper, 43 Presidential Stud. Q. 688, 691 (2013) (stating that the “main source” of polarization was “the 
partisan realignment of the South,” but noting that “[c]onservative whites outside the South also 
moved toward the Republican Party, while liberals became overwhelmingly Democratic”). 
75 See, e.g., Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. Pol. 1 (2009). 
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 The following figure provides one window on this partisan sort. The figure 
uses DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimates, i.e., estimates of legislators’ ideological 
preferences based on their roll call voting records, to track partisan sort over the past 
50 years.76 The solid red line charts the median Republican House member’s ideal 
point from 1963 (close to the nadir of polarization in the 20th century) through 2013; 
the dotted, light blue and dashed, dark blue lines report those values for the median 
southern and non-southern Democratic representative, respectively. The figure 
illustrates two reasons why partisan sort has occurred: (1) the Republican Party 
became more conservative over a half century; and (2) southern (but not northern) 
Democrats became more liberal.77 The latter phenomenon is attributable to the fact 
that a large number of white conservatives in the South have changed their party 
affiliation from Democratic to Republican, leaving a more liberal and largely 
African-American Democratic Party in southern states.78 
 
                                                 
76 Data derived from Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, “Party Medians from DW-NOMINATE, 
Congresses 1-113” [data file], Voteview, available at https://legacy.voteview.com/pmediant.htm (last 
visited June 20, 2017). DW-NOMINATE arranges legislators on a -1 to 1 scale based on their roll call 
voting records, placing legislators with similar voting records close together on the scale. The 
measure does not consider the content of the roll call votes. Once the algorithm is run for a large set of 
votes, the optimal placement of legislators along with scale makes it obvious to any political observer 
that legislators placed near -1 are very liberal and those placed near 1 are very conservative. See Keith 
T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (2000). 
77 As the figure shows, the trend toward polarization is asymmetric, with greater movement away 
from the middle among Republicans than among Democrats. See also Nolan McCarty, Howard 
Rosenthal, & Keith T. Poole, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 12 
(2006) (noting that “Republicans in the North and South have moved sharply to the right,” while 
“Northern Democrats . . . don’t look sharply different from Democrats of old”). 
78 See Nelson Polsby, How Congress Evolves 151 (2005). 
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Figure 1: Party Polarization in the House of Representatives 
 
 
Figure 2 provides another perspective on partisan sort. It shows the gap in 
DW-NOMINATE scores for the median Democratic and Republican members of the 
House between 1963 and 2013. The takeaway from Figures 1 and 2 is clear: the 
parties have become more ideologically distinct over the past 50 years. The increase 
has been nearly monotonic, with polarization accelerating in the second half of this 
period. 
 
Figure 2: Ideological Distance Between the Parties in the House 
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 The phenomenon of partisan sort has clear implications for the ideological 
composition of multimember agencies subject to PBRs. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, when both parties remained relatively ideologically heterogeneous at the elite 
level, we might expect the effect of PBRs on ideological composition to be muted. A 
Democratic President making a cross-party appointment would not be forced to 
choose from among conservatives; likewise, a Republican President would likely be 
able to find qualified Democrats who were not liberals. But as partisan sort 
accelerated over the last two decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 
21st, we might expect the effect of PBRs on ideological composition to grow 
stronger. That is, insofar as supply-side constraints account for the effect of PBRs on 
the ideological composition of multimember agencies, we might expect that effect to 
increase as supply-side constraints become more binding. 
 Accordingly, one way to assess the plausibility of the supply-side theory is to 
look at whether the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies has increased over time. If it has, then that finding would place the supply-
side theory on firmer footing. We will defer further discussion of this point until Part 
II, where we conduct tests to determine whether the effect of PBRs on ideological 
composition is temporally dependent. But first, we consider whether PBRs might 
affect ideological composition through an alternative causal mechanism. 
 
 2.  The Demand-Side Theory 
  
 Once a President has selected a nominee for an agency post, he must “sell” 
that nominee to the Senate. The confirmation hurdle imposes a potential demand-
side constraint on the President’s ability to stock multimember agencies with 
ideologically sympathetic appointees. Senators from the opposition party may use 
what leverage they have to ensure that the President selects a “bona fide” member of 
the opposition party when a PBR forces a cross-party appointment.79 To satisfy 
senators—the “consumers” in our market metaphor—the President may have to 
honor the spirit of PBRs when choosing cross-party commissioners. 
 Insofar as demand-side constraints compel Democratic Presidents to choose 
conservative Republican commissioners and Republican Presidents to name liberal 
Democrats, we might expect these constraints to be most binding under conditions of 
divided government. Presumably, the Senate is more likely to stop a Democratic 
President from appointing a liberal Republican to satisfy a PBR when the Senate is 
Republican-controlled than when the Democrats have a majority (and vice versa 
when it is a Republican President seeking to place a conservative Democrat on a 
commission). To be sure, even a minority opposition party in the Senate has 
                                                 
79 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the 
Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 488 (2008) (“[O]pposition Senators regularly use 
holds and other delaying strategies to pressure the President to appoint party loyalists to slots held by 
opposition-party members.”). 
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historically been able to stop a nominee from being confirmed through the filibuster, 
provided that it could muster 41 votes. But with the abolition of the filibuster for 
agency nominees in November 2013,80 the minority party in the Senate no longer has 
this weapon in its arsenal. 
 The demand-side theory, like the supply-side theory, leads us to expect that 
the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies would 
vary across time. In particular, we might expect the effect to be strongest when the 
White House and Senate are controlled by different parties, and so the Senate can 
easily block a cross-party appointee who is ideologically sympathetic to the 
President. We might also expect the effect to be especially weak in the few periods 
when the President’s party has held a filibuster-proof Senate majority. Our dataset 
encompasses two such periods—both under President Obama. First, the Democrats 
held 60 Senate seats from July 2009 (after Democrat Al Franken was sworn in as 
senator from Minnesota81) until January 2010 (when the Democrats lost a Senate seat 
from Massachusetts following Republican Scott Brown’s victory in a special 
election).82 And second, after the Senate eliminated the filibuster for votes on the 
confirmation of nominees to non-Supreme Court appointments in November 2013, 
the Democrats retained a narrow majority until January 2015 (55-45, including two 
independents who caucused with the Democrats). 
 In the next Part, we examine whether PBRs do indeed affect the ideological 
composition of multimember agencies—and, if so, why. Our approach allows us to 
test both the supply-side and demand-side theories, and to reach tentative 
conclusions as to why PBRs might have real world consequences. 
  
II.  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
 This Part presents our empirical analysis of the effect of partisan balance 
requirements on the ideological composition of multimember agencies. Section II.A 
describes our data and explains our research design. Section II.B presents initial 
results. Section II.C considers supply-side and demand-side explanations for the 
efficacy of PBRs. 
 
A. Data & Research Design 
                                                 
80 See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminates Most Filibusters on 
Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-
limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-
52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html. 
81 See Mark Zdechlik, Franken Brings 60th Vote to Senate Dems, Minn. Pub. Radio (July 1, 2009), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/07/01/franken60. 
82 See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html. 
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To explore the relationship between the partisan and ideological outlooks of 
appointees to agencies with partisan balance requirements (PBR agencies), we first 
must define the population of PBR agencies. Then, we must identify both the 
partisan identification and ideological orientation for each appointee to these PBR 
agencies. This section  details our process for collecting data on (1) PBR agencies, 
(2) appointee partisanship, and (3) appointee ideology. 
 
1.  Agencies with Partisan Balance Requirements 
 
PBR agencies share one essential attribute: a restriction, grounded in statute 
or deeply entrenched norm, on the number of individuals from the same political 
party that may be appointed to the agency’s multi-member governing board. We 
examined appointments to 23 agencies83 that meet this definition and that were in 
existence during the entire 1979-2014 period.84 
With the exception of the NLRB, these agencies’ party balance requirements 
are imposed by statute.85 (We classify the NLRB as a PBR agency based on a firmly 
entrenched norm favoring partisan balance on that body.86) The structural features of 
these agencies vary considerably. Table 1 reports the presence or absence of design 
features in these agencies that, along with PBR, are commonly considered to be 
indicia of agency independence.87  
                                                 
83 These 23 PBR agencies are: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), Farm Credit 
Administration (FCA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), National Mediation Board 
(NMB), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Surface 
Transportation Board (STB, formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission),83 and U.S. International 
Trade Commission (USITC). 
84 See George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Replication Data for: Experiential Learning and 
Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency 
Leadership Appointees, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 914 (2016) [hereinafter Krause & O’Connell, Replication 
Data], available at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/E9UQ0S (last visited  
July 3, 2017); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784 & n.89; David C. Nixon, The Independent 
Regulatory Commissioner Data Base (2005), available at 
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/IRC/index.htm (last visited  July 3, 2017). 
85 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-4(a) (mandating that the EEOC “be composed of five members, not 
more than three of whom shall be members of the same political party”). 
86 See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text. 
87 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
Texas L. Rev. 15, 18 (2010); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784 & n.89 (2013).  An agency’s 
multimember structure is another common feature of independent agencies. See Barkow, supra, at 17; 
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For-cause removal protection prevents the President from removing an 
appointee at will, requiring that the President show cause to do so before the 
expiration of the appointee’s term.88  For instance, FTC commissioners may only be 
removed “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”89 Fixed terms 
in office further insulate appointees to PBR agencies from the White House, and thus 
provide a second indicium of agency independence.90 The ability to pursue litigation 
independent of the Justice Department (“Litigation Authority”); bypass centralized 
OMB review and submit budgets directly to Congress (“Bypass Authority”); and 
craft policy through formal adjudication, which is less susceptible to political 
interference than rulemaking (“Adjudication Authority”), all foster agency 
independence as well.91 Finally, qualification requirements—e.g., that members of 
the National Transportation Safety Board possess transportation-safety-related 
professional credentials and experience92—constrain the President’s hand in 
appointments.93 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 792-97. Because all PBR agencies by definition are headed by 
multiple members, Table 1 omits this feature. 
 Among these 23 agencies, the NMB is an outlier in two respects. First, its power to bind 
outside parties is limited. The NMB can compel railroads or airlines and their employees to arbitrate 
labor disputes if certain conditions are met; if one party refuses to arbitrate, the NMB can authorize a 
labor strike or a lockout by management. 45 U.S.C. § 155. Second, its structure includes only three 
indicia of independence: fixed terms, PBRs and multi-member boards. Nonetheless, we think the 
NMB deserves inclusion. Given the historical significance of labor disputes in the railroad industry 
and the importance of the transportation sector to the national economy, the NMB’s powers, though 
limited, are nontrivial. See Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulations 1 (2014). Further, fixed terms 
and PBRs—both of which the NMB has—are considered particularly important indicia of 
independence. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 188 Duke L.J. 
257, 259 (1988). Nonetheless, excluding the NMB from our analysis does not materially change the 
results. 
88 See Barkow, supra note 87, at 27.  
89 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (2006); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-32 (1935). 
Neither Congress nor the Courts has defined these broad terms constituting good cause, however, see 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986), which raises the possibility that removal protections 
would not constrain a motivated President. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President 
and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 110-11 (1994). 
90 See Peter L. Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United States 15 (1989). 
91 Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 799--804 (regarding litigation authority); id. at 804--08 (bypass 
authority); id. at 808--12 (adjudication authority). 
92 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b). 
93 See William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. Pol. 1095, 1098--
99 (2002). We exclude U.S. citizenship requirements, which impose de minimis constraints on 
appointments, from our classification of qualification requirements. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Included PBR Agencies94 
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CFTC  ● ● ● ● ● 
CPSC ● ● ● ● ● ● 
DNFSB  ●  ● ● ● 
EEOC  ● ●  ●  
Ex-Im  ● ●    
FCA  ● ● ●  ● 
FCC  ●   ●  
FDIC  ● ● ●  ● 
FEC  ● ● ● ● ● 
FERC ● ● ● ● ● ● 
FLRA ● ● ●  ●  
FMC ● ● ●  ●  
FTC ● ● ●  ●  
MSPB ● ●  ● ● ● 
NCUA  ●  ● ● ● 
NLRB ● ● ●  ●  
NMB  ●     
NTSB  ● ●  ● ● ● 
NRC ● ●   ●  
PRC ● ●  ● ● ● 
SEC  ● ● ● ●  
STB / ICC ● ● ● ● ● ● 
USITC  ● ● ●  ● 
 
As Table 1 shows, these agencies vary considerably in terms of their 
particular mix of most of the other indicia of independence – except for the fact that 
all PBR agencies also feature statutorily mandated fixed terms for their 
commissioners or board members. That feature is remarkably common; among all 
executive agencies that are typically classified as independent, only four relatively 
minor agencies do not require set terms for their leaders.95 
                                                 
94 See Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 786 (identifying agencies with statutory removal protection); 
id. at 790 (fixed terms); id. at 800 (litigation authority); id. at 804 (bypass authority); id. at 809 
(adjudication authority); Henry B. Hogue, Statutory Qualifications for Executive Branch Positions, 
CRS Rep. for Congress (Sept. 9, 2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33886.pdf (last 
visited  July 3, 2017) (required qualifications).  
95 Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 790 (listing the Panama Canal Commission, Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, U.S. Trade & Development Agency, and U.S. Agency for International 
Development as the only independent agencies without specified tenure for appointees). 
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2.  Appointee Party Identification 
 
Having identified the set of PBR agencies for this study, we turn to 
determining the partisan affiliations of appointees to these agencies. For 11 agencies 
(the CPSC, EEOC, FCC, FEC, FERC, FTC, NLRB, NTSB, NRC, SEC, and STB), 
we obtained, from an executive-appointee biographical dataset compiled by George 
Krause and Anne Joseph O’Connell, the name, date of nomination, and partisan 
identification for each individual appointed between 1979 and 2008.96 We then 
extended this analysis through 2014 via Congressional Research Service reports 
containing the same information for appointments made between 2000 at 2014.97 To 
assess the reliability of both data sources, we examined the extent to which the two 
sources include identical information for appointees during the 2000-2008 period for 
which the two sources overlap. Inter-observer reliability between the two data 
sources is extremely high; the appointee names, nomination dates, and partisan 
affiliations reported in the two sources in this period were identical. 
For the other 12 agencies, we built an original dataset that includes the name, 
date of nomination, and party affiliation for each individual appointed as a board 
member or commissioner from 1979 through 1999. We drew information on name 
and date of nomination from congressional records and determined partisan 
identifications from a variety of other sources, including newspaper reports around 
the time of nomination and obituaries of now-deceased appointees. Once again, we 
extended this analysis through 2014 via Congressional Research Service reports. 
 
3.  Appointee Ideology 
 
                                                 
96 See George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Replication Data for: Experiential Learning and 
Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency 
Leadership Appointees, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 914 (2016) [hereinafter Krause & O’Connell, Replication 
Data], available at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/E9UQ0S (last visited  
July 3, 2017). Krause and O’Connell’s dataset reports whether each appointee “has [the] same or 
strongly presumed partisan affiliation as [the] appointing President.” See Codebook, Krause & 
O’Connell, Replication Data, available at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2681274&version=1.2 (last visited  July 3, 2017); see 
also George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Compliance, Competence, and Bureaucratic 
Leadership in the U.S. Federal Government Agencies, at 13--17 (Sept. 19, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (describing the database). 
97 Congressional Research Service, Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory 
and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 
eds.), available at https://www.everycrsreport.com (last visited July 3, 2017). We excluded from our 
analysis the nine appointees whom the CRS Reports classified as “independent.” 
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Finally, we employ the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and 
Elections (DIME) to determine the ideological preferences of each appointee.98 
Developed by Adam Bonica, DIME contains over 130 million political contributions 
made by 14.7 million individuals and 1.7 million organizations to over 80,000 
political action committees and candidates in federal, state, and local elections 
between 1979 and 2014.99 DIME leverages these data to generate ideology-based 
scores, referred to as Campaign Finance Scores (CFscores), for all donors and 
recipients during this period.100 
The intuition behind DIME is simple: that individuals’ decisions to contribute 
to political campaigns constitute revealed preferences concerning their political 
views.101 The destination and amount of an individual’s campaign contributions 
disclose information regarding that individual’s ideological “ideal point.” DIME’s 
algorithm uses this information on all of an individual’s donations between 1979 and 
2014 to place donors along a scale based on their history of campaign 
contributions.102 The scale ranges from -2 (assigned to the most liberal donors) to 2 
                                                 
98 See Adam Bonica, Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Aug. 16, 
2016), available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/dime (last visited  July 3, 2017). 
99 Adam Bonica, DIME Codebook, Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) 
(Aug. 16, 2016), available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2865308&version=2.2 
(last visited  July 3, 2017) (providing statistics for the most recent update to DIME). Contribution data 
is derived from the Federal Election Commission and several good-government organizations. Adam 
Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367, 370 (2014) [hereinafter 
Bonica, Ideological Marketplace]. 
100 The use of spatial scores to measure the preferences of political actors is well-established in 
political science. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99, at 368. Their application to 
legal scholarship has become increasingly common in recent years. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Eric A. 
Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President, 45 J. Legal Stud. 401 (2016); Nicholas 
Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1904 (2012). 
In particular, DIME’s CFscores have been employed or cited in a wide variety of social-
scientific and legal scholarship since their debut in 2013. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, & 
Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. Legal Analysis 277 (2016); Abby K. 
Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State 
Political Campaigns, 15 Election L.J. 302 (2016). 
101 Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99, at 367. 
102 For a technical explanation of DIME’s estimation strategic, see Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, 
supra note 99. Essentially, DIME places donors along a unidimensional scale so as to minimize the 
distance between donors with similar patterns of political giving. DIME then places recipients along a 
unidimensional scale so as to minimize the distance between recipients with similar donor pools. That 
some donors also are recipients provides a “bridge,” enabling DIME to place donors and recipients on 
the same scale. Likewise, that some donors contribute to both state and federal campaigns and that 
some recipients run for both state and federal office provides additional bridge observations. These 
bridges enable DIME to create a single ideological scale for a massive number of individuals across 
36 years of politics.  See Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure of State 
Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. Econ. & Org. 472, 476--77 (2015). Bonica has subjected DIME to 
several tests to evaluate the validity of the measure. Concerning the measure’s external validity, 
CFscores for members of Congress correlate closely with the scores assigned to these legislators by 
DW-NOMINATE, a well-established method of estimating legislators ideal points based on their roll-
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(the most conservative donors).103 The mean CFscore for donors is zero and the 
standard deviation is one.104 
To obtain each appointee’s CFscore score, we searched the DIME project’s 
dataset on appointees to federal agencies,105 as well as the project’s full database on 
all contributors to federal, state, and local elections between 1979 and 2014.106 For 
individuals with common names or names with multiple entries in the full database, 
we cross-checked the individuals’ profession, employer, and place of residence as 
reported in DIME with the appointee’s biographical information available via online 
sources – e.g., biographical sketches on current employers’ websites, LinkedIn 
profiles, obituaries, etc. – to determine whether the individual located in DIME and 
the appointee are the same person. This method yielded CFscores for 80% of 
appointees to the 23 PBR agencies whom we identified (578 of 722). This 80% 
match rate is comparable to the success rates of similar studies that employ DIME to 
determine the ideologies of members of other elite groups.107 
 Readers may wonder whether campaign contributions truly capture donors’ 
political preferences. Donors may instead choose to give for a range of strategic 
reasons—e.g., to encourage the election of politicians sympathetic to the donors’ 
business interests, or to curry favor with existing officeholders in exchange for 
access, votes, or other services.108 This critique may seem particularly powerful for 
our research design, given that all donors in our sample actually did receive 
                                                                                                                                          
call voting records. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99, at 370--71 (reporting that r = 
0.92 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates). Concerning internal validity, for 
individuals that are active donors or recipients throughout the 1979-2014 period, these individuals’ 
static CFscores derived from their activity during the entire period are closely correlated with 
CFscores derived from these individuals’ activity during select years within this range. See id. 
(reporting that r = 0.97 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates). 
103 Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99. 
104 Id. 
105 Adam Bonica, Executive Appointees to Federal Agencies, Database on Ideology, Money in 
Politics, and Elections (DIME), available at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/O5PX0B (last visited  
July 3, 2017); see also Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen, and Tim Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, 
Presidential Staffing of “inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the 
Public Bureaucracy, 10 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 5 (2015). 
106 Adam Bonica, DIME Contributors, 1979-2014, Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and 
Elections (DIME), available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2865300&version=2.2 
(last visited  July 3, 2017). 
107 See Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema, & Maya Sen, The Political 
Ideologies of Law Clerks, 19 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 96, 105 (2017) (reporting a 66% match rate for 
former Supreme Court clerks); Bonica, Chen & Johnson, supra note 107, at 20 (72% match rate for a 
subset of appointees under Clinton and George W. Bush); Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On 
the Political Expenditures of Corporations and their Directors and Executives, 18 Bus. & Pol. 367, 
375 (2016) (83% match rate for Fortune 500 CEOs and board members). 
108 See Sanford C. Gordon, Catherine Hafer, and Dimitri Landa, Consumption or Investment? On 
Motivations for Political Giving, 69 J. Pol. 1057, 1058 (2007) (describing donors’ varied potential 
motives). 
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something of value—an executive appointment—at some point during the 36-year 
period in which they made at least one campaign contribution. Our response to this 
concern is twofold. First, we rely on a large body of political science research 
finding that individuals make political contributions sincerely—not strategically.109 
Survey results indicate that donors consider the recipient’s ideology to be the most 
important factor when deciding whether to give, placing ideology far above more 
strategic considerations such as electability, incumbent status, and ability to 
influence the candidate.110 Accordingly, the dominant view among political scientists 
considers campaign contributions as a form of consumption among “political 
hobbyists,” rather than an investment by strategic actors.111 Second, insofar as a 
divergence between donors’ ideological preferences and the ideal points reflected by 
their campaign contributions introduces measurement error into our analysis, we find 
it hard to explain why such a divergence would account for the change over time that 
we document in the next Section. (Below we consider whether the easy observability 
of campaign contributions in the Internet age might affect our results, and we find 
strong evidence that it does not.112) 
 
B. Results 
1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
With these data on appointee ideology and partisan identification in hand, we 
turn to analyzing the effects of PBRs on the composition of agency leadership ranks. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the appointees included in our data: 578 appointees 
to 23 agencies over 36 years. 
 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, at 370; Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign 
Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 Pub. Choice 221 (2009); Nolan McCarty & Lawrence S. 
Rothenberg, Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 872 (1996). 
110 See Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 Pol. 
Research Q. 148, 154 & tbl.1 (2016). 
111 See Eitan Hersh, Political Hobbyism: A Theory of Mass Politics, (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at 
http://www.eitanhersh.com/uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_theory_of_hobbyism_v2.0.pdf (last 
visited  July 3, 2017); accord Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, & James M. Snyder, 
Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 105 (2003). 
112 See infra notes 163-165 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2: Coverage: Appointees by President 
Appointing 
President 
Co-Party 
Appointees 
 
Cross-Party Appointees 
 
 
 
Total 
Appts. 
Appts. 
Per Year 
Total 
Appts. 
Appts. Per 
Year 
 
All 
(1979-2014) 
 
 
362 
 
6.6 
 
216 
 
4.0 
Democratic 
Presidents 
 
155 5.9 96 3.8 
Republican 
Presidents 
 
207 7.2 120 4.3 
 
Carter 
 
 
11 
 
5.5 
 
9 
 
4.5 
Reagan 
 
56 7.0 38 4.8 
G.H.W. Bush 
 
39 9.75 17 4.3 
Clinton 
 
75 9.4 48 6.0 
G.W. Bush 
 
112 14.0 65 8.2 
Obama 
 
69 11.5 39 6.5 
n = 578. Includes appointees to 23 agencies during the 1979-
2014 period. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years 
include 2009-2014 only. 
 
Unsurprisingly, all Presidents during this period tended to appoint their 
fellow party members to PBR agencies; 362 of the 578, or 63 percent, of appointees 
belonged to the same party as the appointing President.113 This tilt is not the result of 
Presidents disregarding PBR statutes.114 Instead, it is possible because most partisan 
balance statutes do not require perfect balance, and instead permit a bare majority of 
                                                 
113 Interestingly, the proportion of appointees that share the President’s party label almost perfectly 
mirrors the no-more-than-three-of-five requirement that is typical among independent agencies. See 
Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 776. 
114 The imbalance is greatest during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, who is not known for his 
sharp partisan elbows. See Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George 
Herbert Walker Bush 390 (2015). 
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members to be affiliated with the same political party.115 The possibility that co-
partisan appointees strategically retire before the end of their terms when a friendly 
President is in office (leading to more openings for co-party slots during any given 
presidency) also may contribute to the imbalance.116 Table 3 contains descriptive 
statistics concerning the ideologies of appointees to PBR agencies, arranged by 
President and by whether the appointee and appointing President shared a partisan 
affiliation. For each President, Table 3 also reports differences in the mean ideology 
of co-party versus cross-party appointees.117  
 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 2053(c) (mandating that no than three out of the five CPSC commissioners be 
affiliated with the same party); 15 U.S.C. 78d(a) (same requirement for the SEC); but see, e.g., 52 
U.S.C. 30106(a)(1) (requiring exact partisan balance on the FEC).  
116 Cf. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments 
37 (2005) (summarizing studies showing that appellate judges strategically time their retirements to 
increase the likelihood that likeminded successors will replace them). 
  Note that the number of appointees per year who appear in DIME is somewhat lower for the 
Carter and Reagan administrations than for later presidencies. We attribute this trend to three factors. 
First, public disclosure of federal campaign contributions did not begin until 1972, and DIME’s 
coverage starts in 1979. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 304, 86 
Stat. 3, 14-15 (1972) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104). Thus, Carter and Reagan 
appointees who made their last campaign contributions before the late 1970s will generally not appear 
in DIME. Second, the $200 reporting threshold has not changed since 1980, despite intervening 
inflation. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, § 103, 93 Stat. 1339, 1352 
(1980) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104). Individuals who made campaign contributions in 
more recent years thus are more likely to exceed the threshold and trigger a public disclosure. Finally, 
one agency was established partway through the 1979-2014 period, resulting in a small increase in the 
number of positions to be filled. See National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 100–456, § 1441(a), 102 Stat. 1918, 2076 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2286) 
(establishing Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board). Excluding the Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board from the analysis does not materially alter any of our results. 
117 The final column in Table 3 reports the p value for a series of two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS) tests for differences in distributions.  Low p values counsel in favor of rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of CFscores for co-party appointees and the distribution of CFscores 
for cross-party appointees were drawn from the same underlying distribution.  All of the reported p 
values meet – and, for all but the Carter appointees, far exceed – the conventionally accepted p < 0.05 
threshold for statistical significance. 
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Table 3: Appointee Ideology, by President 
 Mean CFscore 
(Standard Deviation) 
| Diff. in Means | 118 
 (95% Conf. Interval) 
KS Test p-
value 
Appointing 
President 
 
Co-Party 
Appointees 
Cross-Party 
Appointees 
  
Democratic 
Presidents 
 
-0.913 
(0.521) 
0.774 
(0.535) 
1.687 
(1.549, 1.826) 
0.000 
Republican 
Presidents 
 
0. 848 
(0.368) 
-0.492 
(0.808) 
1.340 
(1.182, 1.497) 
0.000 
 
Carter 
 
 
 
-0.494 
(0.749) 
 
0.301 
(0.828) 
 
0.795 
(0.011, 1.601) 
 
0.047 
Reagan 
 
 
0.797 
(0.539) 
-0.005 
(0.794) 
0.802 
(0.496, 1.108) 
0.000 
G.H.W. Bush 
 
 
0.846 
(0.422) 
-0.162 
(0.900) 
1.008 
(0.497, 1.520) 
0.000 
Clinton 
 
 
-0.875 
(0.408) 
0.747 
(0.494) 
1.622 
(1.447, 1.798) 
0.000 
G.W. Bush 
 
 
0.873 
(0.213) 
-0.830 
(0.615) 
1.703 
(1.546, 1.861) 
0.000 
Obama 
 
 
-1.015 
(0.563) 
0.902 
(0.458) 
1.917 
(1.719, 2.116) 
0.000 
n = 578. Includes appointees to 23 agencies during the 1979-2014 period. Absolute values of 
differences in means between co-party and cross-party appointees reported. Differences in 
means calculated via Welch’s t-tests, appropriate for samples with skewed distributions 
drawn from independent populations. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years 
include 2009-2014 only. During the entire 1979-2014 period, the mean CFscore for all 
appointees was 0.078 (sd=0.961). 
 
 The key takeaway from Table 3 emerges from the column displaying the 
difference in means between co-party and cross-party appointees. During the Carter 
administration, the point estimate for the ideological gap between co-party and cross-
party appointees to PBR agencies is 0.795, which indicates a modest ideological 
                                                 
118 Difference in means refers to the absolute value of the difference in mean CFscore for co-party 
appointees and mean CFscore for cross-party appointees. 
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difference (less than one standard deviation) between Carter’s co-party and cross-
party appointees.119 This gap grows steadily in subsequent administrations, reaching 
1.917 in the Obama years—almost two-and-one-half times the size of the gap under 
Carter. The widening occurs over Democratic as well as Republican administrations. 
Accordingly, at first glance the most notable aspect of this difference is its growth 
over time, rather than its association with any particular party or presidency. 
 
2.  Co-Party vs. Cross-Party Appointees 
 
What do the ideologies of appointees to PBR agencies look like? More 
specifically, how do the views of individuals appointed to Democratic seats by 
Democratic President differ from those appointed to Democratic seats by Republican 
Presidents? And are the patterns similar for Republican appointees? 
To answer these questions, Figure 3 compares the ideological distributions of 
all four categories of nominees. Democratic officials appointed by Democratic 
Presidents appear in dark blue, whereas Democrats appointed by Republicans appear 
in light blue; likewise, Republicans appointed by Republicans appear in dark red, 
whereas Republicans appointed by Democrats appear in light red. Because, for this 
analysis, we are interested in recent appointment behavior, the figure is limited to the 
2000-2014 period. 
 
                                                 
119 See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99 (stating that the mean CFscore for donors is 
zero and the standard deviation is one). 
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Figure 3: Ideologies of Appointees to PBR Agencies, 2000-2014 
 
 
n = 347. Includes appointees made during the 2000-2014 period to 23 PBR 
agencies. 
 
 Figure 3 reveals a striking feature of recent appointments to PBR agencies: in 
expectation, Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents have views virtually 
identical to those of Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents, and the same 
holds true of Republican appointees. Presidents Clinton and Obama did not name 
liberal Republicans to cross-party positions on PBR agencies; neither did President 
George W. Bush appoint conservative Democrats to cross-party seats. Instead, recent 
Presidents abided by the spirit of PBRs in agencies’ organic statutes. 
 Presidents’ willingness to appoint their ideological opponents to cross-party 
seats appears to be a recent development. The following several figures compare the 
ideologies of co-party and cross-party appointees beginning in 1979.Figure 4(a) 
displays the ideological distance between the CFscore of the appointing President 
and the mean CFscore of that President’s appointees to PBR agencies. For a 
Democratic President, a negative value indicates that the mean appointee is more 
liberal than the appointing President, and a positive value indicates that the mean 
appointee is more conservative. For a Republican President, the reverse is the case: 
negative values indicate that the mean appointee is more conservative than the 
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appointing President, and positive values indicate that the appointee is more liberal. 
Figure 4(b) reports similar information by year. The bars emanating from the point 
estimates in both figures denote one standard deviation in each direction from the 
relevant mean. 
 
Figure 4(a): Ideological Distance Between Appointees to PBR Agencies  
and Their Appointing Presidents 
 
 
n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between 
appointees’ CFscore and appointing President’s CFscore. Positive values for appointees in a 
Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more 
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one standard 
deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is standardized to 
y = 0. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years include 2009-2014 only.  
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Figure 4(b): Ideological Distance Between Appointees to PBR Agencies  
and Their Appointing Presidents, by Year 
 
 
n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between 
appointees’ CFscore and appointing President’s CFscore. Positive values for appointees in a 
Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more 
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one standard 
deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is standardized to 
y = 0. 
 
The point estimates for Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that cross-party 
appointees are more conservative than co-party appointees across all Democratic 
administrations and more liberal than co-party appointees in all Republican 
administrations. This gap increases, in fits and spurts, throughout the period of study. 
During the Carter administration, for instance, the CFscore for the mean appointee to 
a Democratic seat was 0.159 points to the left of President Carter’s CFscore, whereas 
the mean appointee to a Republican seat had a CFscore that was 0.636 points to the 
right of President Carter—a gap of 0.795 points. By the Obama administration, the 
mean Democratic appointee was 0.637 points to the right of President Obama, while 
the mean Republican appointee was 2.471 points to the right of the President—a gap 
of 1.834 points. In other words, the ideological gap between co-party and cross-party 
appointees within the same administration widened over time. 
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The associated standard deviations in both figures provide further support 
this finding. In Figure 4(a), the standard deviation bars for co-party and cross-party 
appointees overlap during the Carter, Reagan and George H.W. Bush 
administrations, indicating that a sizable number of co-party and cross-party 
appointees are ideologically similar.  The bars then pull apart in the Clinton, George 
W. Bush, and Obama years, signifying significantly less ideological overlap between 
co-party and cross-party appointees during these presidencies.  The standard 
deviation bars in Figure 4(b) tell a similar story. 
   
 
A time trend appears to be present in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), with the 
ideological distance between cross-party appointees and their appointing President 
increasing over time. Figure 5, below, provides a better sense of this time trend. The 
figure plots the difference in ideological score between the President and cross-party 
appointees over the 36-year study period and includes a linear regression line. The 
positive slope suggests the presence of a trend component. 
 
Figure 5: Time Trend in Ideological Distance Between the President and Cross-Party 
Appointees 
 
 
The supply-side theory suggests that we should observe steady growth in the 
ideological gap between cross-party appointees and their appointing President over 
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time, consistent with the pattern of partisan sort shown in Figure 2. By contrast, the 
supply-side theory gives us no reason to expect any similar changes over time in the 
gap between co-party appointees and their appointing President. None of the six 
Presidents in our study period (Carter through Obama) exhibited ideological 
preferences that were radically out of step with the mainstream of his own party, and 
so we would expect each of these Presidents to be able to find co-partisans whose 
views roughly matched his own. Visually, Figures 4 and 5 align with the supply-side 
theory’s predictions: cross-party appointees have grown further apart from the 
appointing President, while co-party appointees have not.  
 
3.  Ideological Consistency 
  
Our analysis thus far treats appointees’ ideologies as time-invariant. The 
DIME master database assigns each donor a single CFscore based on that 
individual’s total contributions during the 1979-2014 period, and we adopt this 
measure as a proxy for ideology in the analysis above. Yet we are mindful that 
individuals may evolve in their thinking, or that they may donate strategically prior 
to their appointment so as to send a signal of ideology that differs from their true 
preferences. Fortunately, the available data allow us to observe whether donation 
patterns change post-appointment in ways that would suggest either ideological drift 
or strategic giving. 
Although ideological self-categorization is stable for most people throughout 
their lives,120 members of the political class from which appointees are drawn may 
be less consistent. The notion that elite actors display ideological fluidity over their 
careers is familiar to students of judicial behavior. Observers of the Supreme Court 
have pointed to a so-called “Greenhouse effect”—a trend of Supreme Court Justices 
“drift[ing] away from the conservatism of their early votes” and towards the more 
liberal preferences of “cultural elites.”121 While the Greenhouse effect generally 
refers to the evolution of appointees’ sincere preferences over time, a related 
possibility is that prospective appointees may misrepresent their preferences prior to 
                                                 
120 Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, & Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts & Minds 28 (2004). 
121 See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the 
American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 1515, 1518 (2010). The “Greenhouse” in question is Linda 
Greenhouse, the longtime Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times. The term can be 
traced back to a 1992 speech by Judge Laurence Silberman, a Reagan appointee to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who claimed that Greenhouse’s reporting pressured Justices to take 
more liberal stances in order to garner favorable coverage from the Times. See Martin Tolchin, Press 
Is Condemned by a Federal Judge for Court Coverage, N.Y. Times (June 15, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/15/us/press-is-condemned-by-a-federal-judge-for-court-
coverage.html. 
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confirmation and then reveal their true selves after they are sworn in.122 For example, 
a Democratic President may “sell” a nominee to the Senate as a genuine Republican, 
but the individual may turn out to be—after confirmation—a liberal who registered 
as a Republican and donated to conservative candidates for the purpose of 
positioning himself for a potential cross-party appointment. To return to our market 
metaphor, a potential appointee who looks like a peach from the opposition party’s 
perspective may turn out to be a lemon—and consumers (here, senators) have 
incomplete information regarding which nominees fall into which of these categories 
until after the transaction. 
To test the ideological consistency of appointees over time, we examined the 
donation patterns of commissioners in the eight years before and after their initial 
appointment. We looked at commissioners’ cycle-specific scores derived from the 
biennial DIME contribution datasets, which include CFscores for donors in each 
two-year election cycle.123 Naturally, these files are less comprehensive than the 
1979-2014 DIME master database; to be included in one of the election cycle-
specific files, an individual must donate to a sufficient number of candidates or 
PACs to generate a CFscore for that cycle.  
Creating cycle-specific scores enables us to chart commissioners’ ideal point 
estimates over time and identify any changes in behavior around the time of their 
initial appointments. Here, we display results for the FCC, which in several respects 
is the archetypical agency with a PBR; the FCC has the modal number of 
commissioners (five), the modal term length (five years), and, like many of the 23 
agencies in our study, was created during the New Deal era.  
Figure 6 displays our results for both Democratic and Republican appointees 
selected by both Democratic and Republican presidents. To compare commissioners’ 
ideal point estimates before and after appointment, the x axis in both figures denotes 
the number of years since each commissioner was first appointed to the FCC 
(negative numbers thus represent pre-appointment years). 
  
                                                 
122 On “stealth nominees” at the Supreme Court, see Michael Comiskey, The Supreme Court 
Appointment Process: Lessons from Filling the Rehnquist and O’Connor Vacancies, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. 
& Pol. 355, 357 (2008). 
123 We thank Adam Bonica and Kyle Rozema for their assistance in this analysis. 
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Figure 6: Longitudinal Change in FCC Commissioners’ Ideal Point Estimates 
 
 
 
If liberals registered as Republicans and donated to conservative candidates 
so that they could be sold by a Democratic President to Senate Republicans as 
genuine cross-party appointees, then we would expect to see the light red line 
(Democratic President, Republican appointee) trending downwards in later years, as 
appointees who posed as conservatives pre-confirmation revealed their true liberal 
selves. Likewise, if conservatives registered as Democrats and donated to liberal 
candidates so that they could be sold by a Republican President to Senate Democrats, 
then we would expect to see the light blue line (Republican President, Democratic 
appointee) trending upwards in later years, as appointees who posted as liberals 
revealed their true conservative selves. And if appointees tended to drift in a single 
direction (i.e., a Greenhouse effect at multimember agencies), then we would expect 
the lines to be roughly parallel with similar slopes.  
We observe none of these phenomena in Figure 6. For the most part, 
commissioners display consistent ideologies over time. Concerning those 
commissioners for whom we have ideal point estimates both before and after their 
initial appointments, we see only slight, inconsistent movement towards more 
extreme positions post-appointment. 
  
4.  PBR Agencies vs. the Rest of the Executive Branch 
 
To provide broader context for this secular divergence in the ideological 
composition of PBR agencies, we compare ideological preferences of appointees to 
PBR agencies with the ideological preferences of other high-level executive branch 
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policymakers.124  Placing PBR agency appointees and other officeholders on the 
same scale allows us to assess the extent to which the observed trend in PBR 
agencies reflects or departs from changes in the ideological composition of executive 
appointees writ large.  
For this analysis, we leverage a dataset created by Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen, 
and Tim Johnson, which contains DIME-based CFscores scores for all available 
executive appointees between the Reagan and Obama administrations.125 The solid 
curves in Figures 7(a)-(f) depict the ideological distributions of PBR appointees 
across five Presidential administrations; the dashed curves depict these distributions 
for other high-level, Senate-confirmed officials.
                                                 
124 High-level officials encompass heads and commissioners of other independent agencies, 
department secretaries, and second- and third-level leaders (typically deputy secretaries and assistant 
secretaries or undersecretaries) in executive departments. All positions require Senate confirmation.  
125 Adam Bonica, Executive Appointees to Federal Agencies, Database on Ideology, Money in 
Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Aug. 16, 2016), available at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/O5PX0B (last visited  
July 3, 2017); see also Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen, & Tim Johnson, supra note 107, at 5 (2015). To 
allow for longitudinal comparisons across the entire period, we exclude agencies that operated during 
only part of this period, e.g., the African Development Foundation, Corporation for National and 
Community Service, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, and U.S. Information Agency. 
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Figures 7(a)-(e): Ideological Distributions of Appointees to PBR Agencies and Other Agencies 
 
 
 
 
Total observations: 2,318. 
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Figures 7(a) through 7(e) show a remarkable development. Figure 7(a) 
reports that during the Reagan administration, the ideological distribution of 
appointees to PBR agencies—including both co-party and cross-party appointees—
maps closely onto the ideological distribution of high-level executive appointees. 
Both distributions are unimodal, clustered around a conservative President’s own 
CFscore. Figure 7(b) provides a similar picture for the George H.W. Bush 
administration. 
 A change, however, is discernible in the Clinton years. Although most 
Clinton appointees to both PBR agencies and other high-level executive positions are 
clustered around the same left-of-center mode, a right-of-center local maximum has 
begun to develop—but only for appointees to PBR agencies. This bimodality 
becomes more pronounced in the George W. Bush administration (naturally, with the 
locations of the global and local maxima flipping, as the White House switches from 
Democratic to Republican control). The trend continues in the Obama 
administration; by the Obama years, the distribution of appointees to PBR agencies 
is almost completely bimodal, with a cluster of appointees located approximately at -
1 and a second cluster – only slightly smaller – roughly centered around +1. By 
contrast, the distribution of other high-level appointees remains single-peaked, with 
its mode located near the President’s CFscore. 
 To translate these trends from picture to prose: Our findings suggest that 
PBRs had very little effect on the ideological composition of agencies during the 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. The ideological distribution of PBR 
agency appointees closely matches the distribution of appointees to positions not 
covered by PBRs. Starting with the Clinton administration, however, we begin to see 
a distinct PBR effect. President Clinton appointed a fair number of conservatives to 
PBR agencies but named very few conservatives to other posts. The PBR effect 
grows even more pronounced under President George W. Bush and President 
Obama. These results confirm our thesis that PBRs do indeed bite, but that they have 
come to bite only relatively recently. 
 
 5.  Statutory vs. Informal PBRs 
 
 Our analysis thus far has lumped the National Labor Relations Board with 
other PBR agencies, even though the National Labor Relations Board is not subject 
to a formal PBR. The House in 1947 passed legislation that would have added a 
formal partisan balance requirement to the statute governing NLRB membership, but 
the party balance provision was (for reasons not explained in the legislative 
history126) omitted from the version of the bill that passed the Senate and became 
law.127 Nonetheless, there has been a “tradition” since the Eisenhower years that 
                                                 
126 H.R Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36--37 (1947) (noting that party balance provision was 
included in House bill but not in conference agreement, and offering no explanation for omission). 
127 See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 139 (1947). 
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Presidents have filled no more than three of the NLRB’s five seats with members of 
their own party.128 The informal partisan balance requirement at the NLRB is an 
example of what Adrian Vermeuele has called a “convention of agency 
independence”: an unwritten norm that has come to govern the behavior of political 
actors with respect to the agency.129  
The case of the NLRB allows us to examine whether a partisan balance 
requirement that emerges from convention has the same effect on ideological 
composition as a PBR set forth by statute. Table 4 compares the ideologies of 
appointees to the NLRB and the 22 agencies with statutory PBRs for which we have 
obtained data covering the 1979-2014 period. Under Democratic Presidents, cross-
party appointees to the NLRB appear, on average, to be slightly less conservative 
than cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory partisan balance requirements, 
but this difference falls far short of statistical significance (p = 0.945). Likewise, 
under Republican Presidents, cross-party appointees to the NLRB appear on average 
to be slightly less liberal than cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory 
PBRs, but again, this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.849). In short, 
we find little to suggest that the difference between the NLRB’s partisan balance 
convention and the statutory PBRs applicable to other agencies has any effect on 
ideological composition—the NLRB looks much like the statutory PBR agencies in 
terms of the ideological preferences of appointees. 
 
Table 4: Mean Ideology of Appointees to NLRB and Statutory PBR Agencies 
 NLRB Statutory PBR Agencies 
 
 Co-Party 
Appointees 
Cross Party 
Appointees 
Co-Party 
Appointees 
Cross Party 
Appointees 
     
Democratic 
Presidents 
-1.106 
(0.309) 
0.753 
(0.774) 
 
-0.898 
(0.531) 
0.776 
(0.520) 
Republican 
Presidents 
0.681 
(0.760) 
-0.341 
(1.052) 
0.863 
(0.309) 
-0.500 
(0.797) 
     
n = 578. Includes appointments made to the NLRB and 22 other agencies during 
the 1979-2014 period. Cells report mean CFscores and, in parentheses, standard 
deviations. 
                                                 
128 Matthew M. Bodah, Congress and the National Labor Relations Board: A Review of the Recent 
Past, 22 J. Labor Res. 699, 700 (2001); James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s 
Uncertain Future, 26 Comp. Labor Law & Pol’y J. 221, 244 & n. 109 (2005). The last time that the 
NLRB had more than three members from the same party was August 1956, when four Republicans 
and one Democrat served on the board. President Eisenhower then named a Democrat to replace a 
retiring Republican. See Members of the NLRB Since 1935, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited July 16, 2017). 
129 See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163 (2013). 
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Indeed, when we focus on 21st century appointments, we find evidence that 
the partisan balance convention at the NLRB has as much if not more “bite” than 
statutory PBRs elsewhere. Since 2000, Republicans appointed by Democratic 
Presidents to the NLRB have been, on average, even more conservative—and 
Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents to the NLRB even more liberal—
than those Presidents’ cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs.130 
This conclusion, however, comes with an important caveat. Our dataset includes 
CFscores for only six cross-party appointees—three Democrats appointed by 
President George W. Bush and three Republicans appointed by President Clinton or 
Obama—during the 2000-2014 period. This relative lack of data on cross-party 
appointees to the NLRB may not be coincidental. The Board has suffered from 
persistent, politically motivated vacancies during the past several administrations.131 
Whereas Congress permits appointees to other agencies to serve beyond the 
expiration of their terms until their successors are confirmed,132 NLRB members are 
not authorized to serve in an acting capacity.133 That NLRB seats remain vacant until 
filled may provide senators with an additional incentive to delay acting on 
nominations to the Board (beyond their usual incentives to do so for agencies where 
such delay leaves the existing appointees temporarily in place). Accordingly, it is 
possible that partisan gamesmanship is occurring with respect to cross-party 
appointees to the NLRB—it just occurs at an earlier stage in the appointments 
process and thus is not captured by the CFscores for those individuals that make it 
onto the Board. 
In sum, the partisan balance norm that exists by “convention” or “tradition” 
at the NLRB appears to be driving a gap between co-party and cross-party 
appointees that is broadly similar to the gap between co-party and cross-party 
appointees at agencies with statutory PBRs. The bite of partisan balance 
                                                 
130 Further, the results when the analysis is limited to 2000-2014 also lend support to the conventional 
wisdom that the NLRB is an unusually politicized agency. See Brudney, supra note 128, at 223--24; 
Samuel Estreicher, ‘Depoliticizing’ the National Labor Relations Board: Administrative Steps, 64 
Emory L.J. 1611, 1613 (2015); Julius G. Getman, The NLRB: What Went Wrong and Should We Try 
To Fix It?, 64 Emory L.J. 1495, 1496 (2015). For each President/appointee combination, the mean 
NLRB appointee is more extreme than the corresponding cell in the table for the other agencies with 
PBRs. 
131 See Mark Landler and Steven Greenhouse, Vacancies and Partisan Fighting Put Labor Relations 
Agency in Legal Limbo, N.Y. Times (July 15, 2013). 
132 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (providing that CFTC commissioners “shall hold office for a term 
of five years and until his successor is appointed and has qualified, except that he shall not so continue 
to serve beyond the expiration of the next session of Congress subsequent to the expiration of said 
fixed term of office”); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (similar provision regarding the SEC); 42 U.S.C. § 
7171(b)(1) (FERC); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (FCC). 
133 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3349b, 3349c(1)(A) (appointees to multi-member independent agencies cannot 
serve in a holdover or acting position unless otherwise statutorily authorized); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (no 
provision in NLRB organic statute for continuation of service beyond length of fixed term). 
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requirements does not appear to depend on whether these provisions are written into 
law. But whether we are dealing with a statutory PBR or a PBR that arises from 
convention, the puzzle remains as to why these requirements do anything at all to 
shape the ideological composition of multimember agencies. The next section turns 
to that question and to the implications of our results for various theories of PBRs’ 
efficacy. 
 
C. Market Forces and Appointee Selection 
This Section reevaluates our two main causal explanations for the efficacy of 
PBRs—the supply-side theory and the demand-side theory—in light of our empirical 
analysis. We also consider (and largely reject) alternative hypotheses that might 
account for the topline results and time trends observed above. 
 
1.  Supply-Side Constraints  
 
Our results are broadly consistent with the supply-side theory, which holds 
that Presidents are constrained in their selection by the ideological composition of 
the pool of potential cross-party appointees. As the political class from which the 
memberships of boards and commissions are typical drawn becomes more 
ideologically polarized along party lines, it becomes increasingly difficult for a 
President to identify competent individuals whose ideological preferences track the 
President’s own but whose party affiliation does not. Presidents are reactive in this 
narrative; they appoint bona fide cross-party members because these are the only 
competent potential appointees that “the market” supplies. 
The time trends in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) supports this theory. The 
appointment of bona fide cross-party members gradually becomes more prevalent 
from the late 1970s through the mid-2010s, while simultaneously, the political 
classes gradually became more ideologically distinct along party lines. While it 
might seem surprising that a motivated Democratic President cannot find a liberal 
Republican for a cross-party seat or that a motivated Republican President cannot 
find a conservative Democrat, the supply-side theory becomes more plausible if one 
supposes that Presidents care about competence as well as ideological alignment. To 
be sure, a Democratic President might still be able to find someone in a nation of 
more than 300 million people who shares the President’s liberal views but registers 
as an independent or a Republican, and a Republican President might still be able to 
find someone who shares that President’s conservative views but registers as an 
independent or a Democrat. Yet while we observe past Presidents drawing cross-
party appointees from the pools of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats 
when these pools were much larger, we see relatively few cross-party appointments 
of these types in recent years. 
 
2.  Demand-Side Constraints 
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The demand-side theory, by contrast, finds much weaker support here. Recall 
that this theory views senators as the “consumers” in the confirmation market to 
whom the President must “sell” his or her favored nominees. One could imagine that 
Democratic Presidents may want to appointee liberal Republicans to Republican-
designated seats and that Republican Presidents may have the inverse desire, but that 
opposition-party senators use their advice-and-consent authority to block the 
appointments of moderates to party-specific seats. The demand-side theory therefore 
holds that the presence of bona fide cross-party commissioners on PBR agencies is 
attributable to pressure from cross-party senators. 
If this narrative is accurate, one would expect Presidents to appoint genuine 
cross-partisans to cross-party seats only when cross-party senators are sufficiently 
powerful to compel Presidents to do so. By contrast, when cross-party senators do 
not have enough votes to block a party-member-in-name-only nominee, Presidents 
will have free rein to appoint milquetoast partisans to cross-party seats. Essentially, 
one would expect the ideological distance between appointing Presidents and cross-
party appointees to be positively correlated with cross-party senators’ power to deny 
confirmation to disfavored nominees. 
When do cross-party senators have the power to deny confirmation? One 
possibility is that the ability to block cloture—and thus deny a vote on a nominee—
provides cross-party senators with a means of ensuring that the President appoints 
bona fide cross-party members to PBR agencies. This explanation, however, cannot 
explain the time trend in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), i.e., that partisan balance 
requirements have come to exert stronger effects over time. During virtually the 
entire study period, both parties held a sufficient number of seats to block a nominee 
under Senate filibuster rules.134 Yet, as Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, cross-party 
appointees did not become ideologically distinct, at conventionally accepted levels of 
statistical significance, until late in the period. 
Further, a recent change in Senate rules allows for a simple test of the 
Senate’s potential role in giving PBRs their bite—and the results suggest that role is 
limited. On November 21, 2013, the leadership of the Senate Democratic majority 
                                                 
134 For almost the entire 1979-2014 period, confirmation of executive-branch nominees required the 
assent of 60 senators, which is the number needed to invoke cloture under Senate Rule XXII. See 
Senate Rule XXII, §2 (providing that three-fifths of senators are required to invoke cloture, i.e., to 
vote to limit further consideration of a pending question, thereby permitting the question to be put to a 
majority vote). On November 21, 2013, the Senate re-interpreted Rule XXII to allow 51 votes to 
invoke cloture for nominees to positions other than the Supreme Court. Accordingly, a unified 
opposition party holding at least 41 Senate seats prior to that date, or 51 seats thereafter, could block a 
nominee. See Walter Oleszek, Changing the Senate Cloture Rule at the Start of a New Congress, CRS 
Rep. for Congress (Dec. 12, 2016), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44709.pdf (last visited 
July 3, 2017). This new interpretation applies only if the vote occurs pursuant to a specific procedural 
posture. Id. The opposition party needs 51 votes, rather than 50, to block a nominee after November 
21, 2013, because, in the event of a 50-50 tie, the Vice President would vote for confirmation. 
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exercised the “nuclear option” and altered the chamber’s interpretation of Senate 
Rule XXII to reduce the number of votes needed to invoke cloture for nominees to 
positions other than Supreme Court justiceships from 60 to 51 (or 50, with the Vice 
President as a tiebreaker).135 For only the second time during the study period, a 
unified cross-party (here, the Republicans) did not possess sufficient votes to prevent 
a Senate majority from invoking cloture on a confirmation vote for a nominee to a 
PBR agency. A Senate-focused theory of PBRs’ bite would predict that President 
Obama’s appointees to cross-party seats would tend to be more liberal after 
November 21, 2013. In reality, however, appointees to cross-party PBR seats in the 
12 months after this date are 0.179 points more conservative than appointees to 
cross-party PBR seats in the prior 12 months—a difference that is in line with the 
long-term year-to-year increases in ideological distance between the President and 
cross-party appointees displayed in Figure 4(b). 
The other period in which a unified cross-party (again, the Republicans) did 
not possess sufficient votes to block a Senate majority from invoking closure was 
July 7, 2009 through February 4, 2010.136 That period was bookmarked, on one end, 
by the seating of Senator Al Franken of Minnesota as the 60th Democratic senator 
following a long recount, and, on the other end, by the seating of Scott Brown, a 
Republican from Massachusetts, after a special election that reduced the Democratic 
caucus to 59.137 During that interval, the Obama administration’s appointees to cross-
party seats were 0.111 points more liberal than they had been in the period between 
President Obama’s inauguration and Senator Franken’s swearing-in. This slightly 
more liberal tilt in cross-party appointees during a period in which Democrats 
controlled the White House and held a supermajority in the Senate hints at a 
demand-side effect. 
Trends following Senator Brown’s seating, however, cut against the demand-
side theory. Following Brown’s seating, Senate Democrats saw their filibuster-proof 
supermajority end. The demand-side theory predicts that cross-party appointees 
would trend conservative based on Senate Republicans’ relatively greater power in 
this period. Yet in the 12 months following Brown’s seating, cross-party appointees 
were 0.093 points more liberal than they were during interval in which the 
Democrats held a supermajority. This slight liberal trend continued through the date 
on which Senate Democratic leadership exercised the nuclear option. 
                                                 
135 See Walter Oleszek, Changing the Senate Cloture Rule at the Start of a New Congress, CRS Rep. 
for Congress (Dec. 12, 2016), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44709.pdf (last visited  July 
3, 2017).  
136 See Monica Davey and Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in Senate, N.Y. 
Times (June 30, 2009) (stating that Franken’s seating would give the Democrats 60 seats in the 
Senate, which is sufficient to overcome a filibuster); Janet Hook, Republican Scott Brown of 
Massachusetts Sworn In to Senate, L.A. Times (February 4, 2010) (stating that Brown’s seating 
would reduce the Democrats’ numbers to 59, depriving them of this ability). 
137 See id. 
Sept. 2017 draft] PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE  49 
 
Table 5 compares the actual trends in cross-party appointee ideology around 
these demand-side pivotal moments with the effects that we might predict on the 
basis of the demand-side theory.  (In all intervals in the table, cross-party appointees 
are Obama appointees to Republican seats.)  In only one of the three intervals—
roughly what one might expect from three coin flips—does reality line up with the 
predictions generated by the demand-side theory. While we cannot entirely rule out 
the possibility that the opposition party’s ability to block a nomination has a modest 
effect on the ideological composition of multimember agencies, the evidence from 
these Obama-era shocks casts significant doubt on the demand-side story. 
 
Table 5: Using Demand Shocks to Assess the Demand-Side Hypothesis 
Intervals Obama 
Inaugurated – 
Franken Seated 
 
Franken Seated – 
Brown Seated 
Brown Seated –  
Nuclear Option 
Exercised 
Nuclear Option 
Exercised – End of 
Democratic Majority 
Demand-side theory 
predicts cross-party 
appointees will be …  
 
 
– 
more liberal than 
previous period 
more conservative 
than previous 
period 
more liberal than 
previous period 
Cross-party appointees 
actually were … 
 
  
 
– 
more liberal than 
previous period 
more liberal than 
previous period 
more conservative 
than previous period 
 
But perhaps the demand-side mechanism is subtler than simply whether a 
completely unified cross-party could prevent a floor vote. After all, senators rarely 
utilize their Rule XXII prerogative for nominees to executive-branch positions.138 Of 
those executive-branch nominations that are reported out of committee, only 4% die 
on the floor, a figure that includes failures to pass a cloture motion to end a filibuster, 
filibuster threats, and individual senators’ holds on nominations.139 By contrast, 
Senate committees fail to report out approximately 20% of nominations, which 
effectively ends these nominees’ chances of confirmation in most cases.140 The role 
that majority-party-dominated committees play in the process suggests that a Senate 
party’s influence over nominations is far broader—and, perhaps, harder to define—
than simply the binary matter of whether the party (if completely unified) possesses 
41 votes to deny cloture.  
To test the hypothesis that the power of the cross-party in the Senate 
influences the President’s choice of moderates or ideologues for cross-party seats on 
PBR agencies, we regress the ideological distance between each cross-party 
                                                 
138 See Bonica, Chen & Johnson, supra note 105, at 10.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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appointee and the appointing President (“CFscore Difference”141) on the cross-
party’s seat share in the Senate at the time of each appointment (Model 1). As an 
alternative specification, we also regress CFscore Difference on whether the cross-
party held a Senate majority at the time of the appointment (Model 2); “Divided 
Government” is coded as 1 if the cross-party held at least 51 Senate seats.142 Finally, 
Models 3 and 4 add a time-trend variable into the mix. “Time” signifies the number 
of years since the inception of the series in 1979 that a given cross-party appointee 
was confirmed. Including both “Time” and either “Cross-Party Seat Share” or 
“Divided Government” in these final two models, enables us to pit the supply-side 
and demand-side hypotheses directly against each other. 
 
Table 6: Senate Composition and Cross-Appointee Selection 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Cross-Party Seat Share 
 
 
 
-0.036 
(0.027) 
 
— 
 
 
-0.027** 
(0.009) 
 
— 
 
Divided Government 
 
 
—  -0.294 
(0.227) 
— -0.202* 
(0.100) 
Time (Years Since 1979) 
 
 
— — 0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.044*** 
(0.005) 
 
n = 216. Unit of analysis: Cross-party appointees to 23 agencies during the 1979-2014 
period. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years include 2009-2014 only. 
Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. Robust standard errors clustered at the two-year 
Congress-level are given in parentheses. Table includes fixed effects for each presidency 
(baseline category: Carter administration). *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
All models are estimated via OLS regression.  
 
Table 6 shows no support for the hypothesis that the cross-party’s power in 
the Senate encourages the President to choose cross-party appointees to PBR 
agencies whose views are further from the President’s own. The coefficient estimates 
for Cross Party Seat Share and Divided Government are negative in all four models 
(and statistically significant in two of the four), indicating the President selects cross-
party appointees who are closer to his or her ideal point when the cross-party is more 
powerful in the Senate. These negative estimates are precisely the opposite of the 
demand-side theory’s predication: that a stronger cross-party in the Senate should 
pull cross-party appointees in its direction and away from the President’s ideal point. 
                                                 
141 Recall that positive values of CFscore in a Democratic (Republican) administration indicate that 
the mean appointee is more conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. 
142 To create both Cross-Party Seat Share and Divided Government, independent senators who caucus 
with a particular party are classified as members of that party. 
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By contrast, the coefficient estimates for Time are positive and statistically 
significant in both of the models in which they appear (Models 3 and 4). As the 
series progresses—and as partisan sort proceeds—cross-party appointees steadily 
become more extreme.  When tested in competition with the demand-side theory, the 
supply-side theory retains its explanatory power. 
None of this is to suggest that individual senators are irrelevant to the 
selection of cross-party appointees.143 In particular, the leader of the opposition party 
in the Senate (i.e., the minority leader when the President’s party controls the Senate, 
or the majority leader when it does not) often plays an outsized role in the process.144 
Senate Republican leader Bob Dole sent recommendations for cross-party 
appointments to President Clinton throughout the latter’s first term.145 Dole’s 
successor as Senate Republican leader, Trent Lott, continued the practice146—in one 
case clashing with fellow Republican Senator Orrin Hatch regarding the respective 
roles of the leader and Senate committee chairs in cross-party appointments.147 
Senate Democratic leaders Tom Daschle and Harry Reid frequently forwarded 
names for cross-party appointments to President George W. Bush.148 According to 
one account, Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell made a particularly 
concerted effort to advance conservative ideologues for cross-party seats under 
President Obama, whereas earlier leaders often selected nominees on the basis of 
                                                 
143 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-agencies-sometimes-in-name-
only.html (noting that senior senators have been “instrumental” in the selection of SEC 
commissioners in recent years). 
144  
145 Kamen, supra note 59, at A21; see also John Maggs, GOP Lawmakers Oppose Bragg as ITC 
Chairman, J. Commerce, May 26, 1994, at 1A (noting that other Republican lawmakers were upset 
with Dole’s recommendation for a cross-party seat on the International Trade Commission); Dina 
Elboghdady, Owen Sees ICC Post as Capital Opportunity, Orange Cnty. Reg. (Feb. 5, 1995) (noting 
that Clinton cross-party appointee to Interstate Commerce Commission had been recommended by 
Dole); Lynn Stevens Hume, Dole Urges Clinton To Name Unger, Banking Committee Lawyer, to 
SEC Post, Bond Buyer, Sept. 19, 1995, at 1 (noting that Dole had recommended that Clinton name a 
Republican Senate aide to a cross-party seat on the SEC). 
146 See, e.g., Senate Spat Over Lott’s FCC Picks, Wired (Apr. 10, 1997), 
https://www.wired.com/1997/04/senate-spat-over-lotts-fcc-picks. 
147 See Michael Grunwald, Sentencing Panel’s Own Terms Are Up, Wash. Post (Aug. 28, 1998), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/08/28/sentencing-panels-own-terms-are-
up/da055846-230d-448f-b33c-11f596cb1f4d/?utm_term=.47875b15ee4f (noting conflict between Lott 
and Hatch). The Sentencing Commission, an advisory panel, is located in the judicial rather than 
executive branch and so is excluded from our empirical analysis. 
148 See, e.g., Mark Wigfield, Sen. Daschle Recommends Democratic Aide for FCC Post, Dow Jones 
News Serv. (Nov. 15, 2001); Judith Burns, Daschle Recommends Hispanic-American Candidate for 
SEC, Dow Jones News Serv. (Jan. 7, 2002); Daschle Recommends Goldschmid for SEC, Am. 
Banker, Jan. 30, 2002, at 4; Jenny Anderson, Democrats Push S.E.C. Official for Commission Seat, 
N.Y. Times (May 18, 2005), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2DA1639F93BA25756C0A9639C8B63;  
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home-state connections or recommendations from other caucus members.149 Most 
recently, a spokesman for Minority Leader Charles Schumer said in March 2017 that 
Senate Democrats “intend to assert our prerogative on nominees as always has been 
done,”150 and Schumer has advanced several Democrats for cross-party appointments 
in the months since President Trump took office.151 
But while the leader of the opposition party in the Senate no doubt plays an 
important role in the selection process, we do not believe that the widening 
ideological gap between co-party and cross-party appointees can be attributed to 
Senate leadership. First, the role of Senate leaders is purely advisory. As a formal 
matter, any provision that vested a Senate leader with the statutory power to choose 
an executive branch officer would violate the Appointments Clause of Article II.152 
And as a practical matter, Presidents do not always follow the suggestions of Senate 
leaders. For example, then-Senate Minority Leader Dole complained that President 
Clinton often chose “Clinton Republicans” for cross-party seats and ignored Dole’s 
recommendations.153 Likewise, then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid complained 
in 2008 that although he and President George W. Bush “were able to work 
cooperatively on [cross-party] nominations” through most of Bush’s second term, 
“there has been a notable shift in the President’s stance on these nominations from 
one of cooperation to intransigence,” with the Bush White House rejecting several of 
Reid’s suggestions during the final year of the Bush presidency.154 
Second, when Senate leaders recommend nominees, they do so in the shadow 
of the White House’s range of acceptable options. Thus, even when the President 
follows the opposition party leader’s recommendation, it would be a mistake to 
attribute the appointment to the opposition party leader alone. Former aides to Senate 
leaders describe a back-and-forth process whereby the leader proposes an appointee 
                                                 
149 See Daniel Foster, Agent McConnell, Nat’l Rev., June 3, 2013, at 30. 
150 Kelcee Griffis, Trump Nixes Rosenworcel Nomination To Return to FCC, Law360 (Mar. 2, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/897483/trump-nixes-rosenworcel-nomination-to-return-to-fcc 
(quoting Schumer spokesman). 
151 See, e.g., David Lieberman, President Trump Renominates Jessica Rosenworcel to FCC, Deadline 
(June 14, 2017), http://deadline.com/2017/06/president-trump-renominates-jessica-rosenworcel-fcc-
1202113089 (noting that Schumer recommended Trump cross-party nominee); Harper Nedig, 
Schumer Recommends Consumer Advocate for FTC, The Hill (May 8, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/finance/332535-schumer-recommends-consumer-advocate-for-ftc. 
152 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 127-37 (1976) (striking down provision in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act that purported to authorize the President pro tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the 
House to choose four members of the FEC). 
153 Kamen, supra note 59, at A21. 
154 Martin Kady II, Reid Letter Shows White House Rejected Nominee Compromise, Politico (Feb. 
28, 2008), http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-now/2008/02/reid-letter-shows-white-house-
rejected-nominee-compromise-006621 (quoting letter from Reid to White House Chief of Staff 
Joshua Bolton). Reid’s letter also made the surprising—and flatly false—claim that “I have the 
statutory authority to make recommendations to the President for Democratic positions on 
independent boards and commissions.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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to a cross-party seat and the White House either accepts the nomination or offers a 
counterproposal.155 These negotiations are sometimes bound up in bargaining 
between the White House and senators over issues unrelated or tangential to the 
appointment in question.156 
Third, insofar as cross-party appointments are driven by the opposition 
party’s Senate leader, we would expect that leader’s influence to be at its peak when 
the opposition party holds more seats in the Senate. Yet as illustrated by Table 6, our 
data do not bear out that prediction. Remarkably, the extent to which Presidents 
choose genuine cross-partisans for multimember commission seats has no apparent 
relationship to the political power of the opposition party leader. 
Fourth and finally, while the median Senate Democrat and median Senate 
Republican have grown farther apart ideologically over the course of our study 
period, we see much less ideological movement among the party’s respective Senate 
leaders. Figure 8 compares the CFscores for the Senate Democratic and Republican 
leaders, denoted with bold lines, with the median appointees to Democratic and 
Republican seats on agencies with PBRs; appointees to co-party seats are denoted 
with thin, solid lines, whereas appointees to cross-party seats are denoted with dotted 
lines. As the figure shows, changes over time in the median CFscores of cross-party 
appointees bear little discernable relationship to changes in the CFscores of Senate 
leaders. For example, Mitch McConnell, who led the Senate Republicans through the 
Obama years, has a CFscore that is 0.030 points lower (less conservative) than 
Howard Baker, the Senate Republican leader under Carter, whereas the median 
cross-party (Republican) appointee under Obama is 0.386 points more conservative 
than the median cross-party appointee under Carter. In other words, Republicans 
appointed by Democratic Presidents grew much more conservative even while the 
Senate Republican leader (as measured by CFscore) grew slightly less so. Likewise, 
Harry Reid, who led the Senate Democrats during George W. Bush’s second term, 
has a CFscore that is only 0.194 points lower than that of Robert Byrd, the Senate 
Democratic leader under Reagan, while the median CFscore for George W. Bush’s 
cross-party (Democratic) appointees is 1.190 points lower than the median CFscore 
for Reagan’s cross-party appointees. That is, Democrats appointed by Republican 
Presidents grew substantially more liberal even while the CFscore for the Senate 
Democratic leader barely budged. In sum, we find little evidence to suggest that the 
divergence between co-party and cross-party appointees over our study period can be 
explained by an increase in the power of opposition party senators or Senate leaders 
in the selection process. 
 
                                                 
155 Telephone Interview with Ronald Weich, former chief counsel to Sen. Reid (Aug. 29, 2017); 
Telephone Interview with Steve Seale, former chief counsel to Sen. Lott (Aug. 30, 2017).  
156 E-mail from Senator Jon Kyl, Former Senate Minority Whip, to authors (Aug. 25, 2017, 16:33 
EDT) (on file with authors) (“[T]he minority is always looking for leverage, and nominations for 
anything work.”). 
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Figure 8: Senate Leaders and Appointees to Agencies with PBRs 
 
 
3.  Search Costs 
 
Along with increased partisan sort, another broad social phenomenon may 
have increased PBRs’ bite occurred during this period: an information-technology 
revolution that slashed the cost of obtaining data on nominees. Forty years ago, 
learning about the detailed political views of a potential appointee might require 
using one’s Rolodex to contact members of the appointee’s social or professional 
circle and investing the time and political capital to convince these mutual 
connections to speak candidly (and, naturally, as a prerequisite, one would need to 
have the connections and status to pull this off). Today, one can procure similar 
information with a few keystrokes—as we did. As a result, a wide variety of 
interested parties—including Senate staffers, activists, and journalists—can 
inexpensively obtain information regarding the ideologies of potential appointees. In 
light of the reduction in the costs associated with obtaining this information, perhaps 
the President’s ability to present conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans as 
stealth nominees has diminished. 
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While this search-costs hypothesis has some appeal, we are skeptical that it is 
driving our results for three reasons. First, this hypothesis understates the amount of 
information concerning potential appointees’ donations that was publicly accessible 
throughout this period. The FEC has a long-established reputation for facilitating 
public access to its data.157 For virtually the entire period, the FEC considered reports 
on receipts and FEC-generated indices of these receipts to be subject to the Freedom 
of Information Act, and thus endeavored to provide “the fullest possible disclosure” 
to the public.158 In 1980, Congress required the FEC to make reports submitted by 
campaigns “available for public inspection,” and to “develop a filing, coding, and 
cross-indexing system” to facilitate public access.159 The FEC met this obligation 
that same year.160 Since 1996, the FEC has provided to the public comprehensive 
electronic records of campaign contributions dating back to the late 1970s.161 In 
1998, the FEC debuted an Internet-based search function that allows users to search 
the FEC’s online database for specific donors by name.162  
Access to campaign contributions data likely was more difficult prior to the 
current era of searchable online databases. Still, interested parties had the means to 
access this information throughout the study period. Even during the years in which 
identifying contributors required reviewing indices of campaign contributions, the 
stakes to Presidents, senators, and affected interest groups of placing a “disloyal” 
appointee on a board or commission likely were sufficiently high—and the resources 
available to these individuals and entities sufficiently deep—to outweigh these 
relatively modest search costs. 
Second, political donations are but one of several ways to convey an 
individual’s partisan affiliation. Presidents and senators could employ many other 
screens to divine potential appointees’ partisan affiliations: for instance, whether an 
individual consistently votes in party primaries, has a record of volunteering for 
                                                 
157 See R. Sam Garrett, The Federal Election Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for 
Congress, CRS Rep. for Congress, Dec. 22, 2015, at 17 (“[T]he FEC generally is praised for its role in 
publicizing campaign finance data.”); Jeremy Gaunt, ed., A Rocky Decade Later, the FEC Gets Little 
Respect, Campaign Practices Rep., Feb. 11, 1985, at 2 (“[M]ost . . . are willing to credit the agency 
with at least one major success. . . . [T]he FEC has built on earlier attempts to make campaign finance 
data open to public scrutiny and has made disclosure of campaign dollars and accepted and expected 
part of the electoral process.”).  
158 See 11 C.F.R. §§ 5.2(a), 5.4(a)(1) (2010); accord 65 Fed. Reg. 9206 (Feb. 24, 2000); 52 Fed. Reg. 
39213 (Oct. 21, 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 23638 (June 24, 1987); 50 Fed. Reg. 50778 (Dec. 12, 1985); 45 
Fed Reg. 31292 (May 13, 1980) (versions of the rule in effect between 1980 and 2010); but see 44 
Fed. Reg. 33368 (June 8, 1979) (stating that FOIA does not apply to reports of receipts and related 
indices).  
159 Pub. L. 96–187, § 311(a)(3)-(4) (Jan. 8, 1980). 
160 Telephone Interview with Senior Public Affairs Specialist, Public Records Branch, Federal 
Election Commission (May 30, 2017). 
161 Press Release, Federal Election Commission, FEC Launches New Web Info, July 21, 1998, 
available at http://classic.fec.gov/press/press1998/websrch.htm (last visited June 20, 2017). 
162 Id. 
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political campaigns, or participates in a political party or party-connected group. 
Indeed, the secular decline in mass participation in civic activity over the past several 
generations suggests that, in some respects, it may have been easier to discern an 
individual’s partisan affiliation in 1979 than in 2014.163 
Third, we construct what should be a relatively easy test for the search-costs 
hypothesis – and obtain null results. This test exploits the FEC’s introduction of a 
search function for its online database of campaign contributions on July 21, 1998, 
which constituted the single greatest reduction in search costs during this period. If 
the search-costs hypothesis is doing any significant work, we would expect to see it 
here. Yet we do not. 
Model 1 in Table 7 is similar to the regression models presented in Table 6 
above, except that here, we add a dummy variable denoting whether the nomination 
occurred after the search function for the FEC’s online database became publicly 
accessible on July 21, 1998.164 A positive, statistically significant estimate for this 
coefficient would support the alternative hypothesis that greater access to 
information reduced the White House’s ability to get a “cross-partisan in name only” 
past opposition party senators. Model 1, however, shows a null result. 
Model 2 tests a slight variation on the alternative hypothesis. What if 
interested parties gradually began to adapt to the FEC website’s new search function, 
whether because they learned about the function over time through word of mouth or 
because old-guard staffers were secularly replaced with more internet-savvy political 
operatives? Instead of a discrete jump in effect size following the roll-out of the 
search function, we would expect the time trend in the dependent variable to pick up 
speed after July 21, 1998. In other words, we would expect a positive coefficient on 
the interaction of the “date of nomination” and “nomination after July 21, 1998” 
variables tests for this phenomenon. As Model 2 shows, however, the coefficient on 
the interaction term is statistically insignificant and, in fact, weakly negative.165 In 
                                                 
163 Further, to the extent that members of Congress are consulted in executive appointments, the 
fraying personal connections between legislators and their individual constituents presents an 
additional impediment to evaluating a potential appointee’s partisan loyalty that is more significant in 
the later years of the study period. Compare Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in 
their Districts (1978), with Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Challenge of Congressional Representation 
(2013). 
164 Observations in Table 7 are limited to the 145 cross-party appointees for whom we were able to 
obtain the exact date of nomination. 
165 We also ran a series of placebo tests, substituting July 21 of the years 1993-1997 and 1999-2007 in 
place of the “Nomination after July 21, 1998” variable and interaction-term component. These dates 
have no special relevance; we included them simply to determine whether the coefficient estimates in 
models including these dates differ in any meaningful way from the estimates reported in Table 7. The 
results of these placebo tests are substantially similar to those reported in Table 7 (although the 
divided government variable lacks statistical significance in most of these placebo models, as 
expected). 
 To determine whether a discontinuity in cross-appointee ideology exists around July 21, 
1998, we constructed a regression-discontinuity model. However, a relative lack of observations 
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other words, we find little evidence that the ideological distance between the 
President and cross-party appointees increased at a faster pace after the FEC’s 
website search rollout. 
 
Table 7: Effects of FEC Search Functionality on Cross-Appointee Selection 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Divided Government 
 
-0.304 
(0.155) 
 
-0.332 
(0.170) 
 
Date of Nomination 0.042** 
(0.015) 
0.045* 
(0.017) 
 
Nomination after July 21, 1998? 0.036 
(0.272) 
40.636 
(98.771) 
 
Date of Nomination * Nomination after 
July 21, 1998? 
-- 
 
-0.020 
(0.049) 
 
n = 145. Unit of analysis: Cross-party appointees during the 1979-2014 period for 
whom we know the exact date of nomination (a subset of the dataset used in previous 
models). Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 
0.01, * p < 0.05. All models are estimated via OLS regression. Parameter estimates 
for the intercepts are omitted. 
 
To sum up so far: Our results are consistent with a supply-side story in which 
partisan sort starting in the 1980s tightened the relationship between party affiliation 
and ideology, and so the preferences of cross-party appointees increasingly diverged 
from those of the appointing President. Our results are less consistent with a 
demand-side story in which the power of the opposition party in the Senate (or the 
influence of its leader) drives change over time in the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies. Finally, we find no support for the hypothesis that an 
Internet-induced reduction in search costs has prevented recent Presidents from 
                                                                                                                                          
around the July 21, 1998 cut-point impeded the analysis; using any reasonable set of parameter 
assumptions, the rdbwselect function in R recommended bandwidths of approximately 2 years – 
hardly a knife-edge. Using this bandwidth, the model reported a statistically significant, positive 
discontinuity at the cut-point. But we do not put much stock in this result; given the unacceptably 
large bandwidth size, the model likely is picking up the well-documented time trend and misreporting 
it as a “knife-edge” discontinuous jump. 
 Finally, we constructed a regression-kink model, which tests for a discontinuous change in 
slope, rather than an upward shift in the regression curve, at around this date. The theory here is that 
interested parties may have learned about (and learned how to use) the FEC’s searchable database 
gradually, and therefore we might expect a change in the rate of growth in the ideological gap after 
this date, rather than an abrupt increase. This model reported null results, but, once again, serious 
bandwidth selection issues prevent firm conclusions. 
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filling cross-party seats with individuals whose campaign contributions reveal 
themselves to be out of step with their party of registration. 
 
4.  Identity Signaling 
 
Finally, the notion that appointment-seeking members donate solely to 
convey that they are loyal party members may bear on this analysis. Consider, for 
instance, a highly regarded product safety lawyer angling for a seat on the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission. Her qualifications are unimpeachable, but her 
involvement in partisan politics is either trivial or dated.166 She may therefore benefit 
from donating to her party’s candidates solely to convey that she is a member of that 
party. This rationale stands apart from the sincere-versus-strategic dichotomy 
discussed in subsection II.B.3. Although this behavior obviously is not a sincere 
expression of closely held beliefs, neither is it strategic in the sense that it is designed 
to misrepresent an individual’s ideological preferences. It simply broadcasts: “I am a 
member of this team.” 
If this motivation for political giving is widely held, then changes in 
appointees’ ideal point estimates over time might not capture genuine changes in 
their political views. Rather, if members of the political class donate mechanistically 
to candidates on their party’s ticket, and the ideological composition of the ticket 
changes over time as a result of partisan sort among candidates, then the observed 
longitudinal changes in appointees’ ideal point estimates would be epiphenomenal. 
Phrased another way, whereas a Washington lawyer could show loyalty to the 
Republican Party in 1970 by donating the Nelson Rockefeller, today he might do so 
by giving to Ted Cruz. Neither action is necessarily infused with much meaning; 
they both convey party loyalty—and, perhaps, nothing more.167 
We acknowledge that partisan sort among candidates may encourage donors 
interested solely in signaling their party loyalty to support more extreme candidates 
in 2014 than in 1979. But we caution that this theory’s explanatory power is limited. 
First, it cannot account for the fact that co-party and cross-party appointees differed 
markedly throughout the 1980s and 1990s. That Democrats selected by President 
Carter exhibit sharply different donation activity than Democrats selected by 
                                                 
166 This example is loosely based on Marietta Robinson, a product-safety lawyer with a long career 
representing both plaintiffs and defendants. Robinson ran as a Democrat for a Michigan Supreme 
Court seat in 2000, served in several nonpartisan positions in the 2000s, and was appointed by 
President Obama to a Democratic seat on the CPSC in 2013. 
167 Cf. Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless (1978) (“I think it can safely be assumed that the 
overwhelming majority of shopkeepers never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor 
do they use them to express their real opinions. That poster was delivered to our greengrocer from the 
enterprise headquarters along with the onions and carrots. He put them all into the window simply 
because it has been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because that is the way it 
has to be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble.”).  
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President Reagan casts doubt on the notion that appointment-seekers’ ideal point 
estimates merely reflect the ideal points of their party’s candidates.  
Second, and somewhat to our surprise, we found that appointees to PBR 
agencies routinely make contributions to candidates from both political parties. Even 
among appointees to the high-profile, highly politicized FCC, fully a third of 
appointees in our dataset (11 out of 33) donated to both Democratic and Republican 
candidates. If likely nominees are using campaign contributions solely to signal that 
they are on “Team Blue” or “Team Red,” the signals they are sending are remarkably 
noisy. 
Third, even with the trend towards polarized parties, donors who give 
exclusively to candidates from one party still have a wide variety of options from 
which to choose. In 1980, the mean Republican candidate on a general election ballot 
for state or federal office had a CFscore of 0.770, while the mean Democratic 
candidate’s score was -0.365. (Recall that a higher CFscore indicates greater 
conservatism.) By 2014, those means were 1.046 and -0.985, respectively. But the 
standard deviations around these means also increased between 1980 and 2014: from 
0.368 to 0.573 for Republicans from 0.529 to 0.668 for Democrats.168 In other words, 
party-loyal donors in 2014 could donate to a candidate who adopted the posture of a 
1980-style Democrat (or 1980-style Republican) and who still was located within 
one standard deviation of the current party mean.  That Democratic (Republican) 
appointees did not do so, and instead chose to give to more liberal (conservative) 
appointees, provides further support for the claim that appointees themselves have 
grown more extreme. 
 
III.  IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
We can now say with some confidence that PBRs are more than paper 
tigers—that they do indeed lead Presidents to choose cross-party appointees with 
divergent ideological preferences. Our results have clear implications for the leading 
accounts of partisan balance requirements in the political science and administrative 
law literatures. Our results also suggest avenues for future research on the effects of 
PBRs. This last Part considers those implications and potential extensions of our 
project. 
 
A.  The Monitoring Account 
 
One perspective on PBRs in the political science and administrative law 
literature emphasizes the relationship between PBRs and the cost of monitoring 
agency actions. PBRs can reduce monitoring costs for Congress in three ways. First, 
                                                 
168 See Adam Bonica, “All Recipients, 1979-2014” [data file], Database on Ideology, Money in 
Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Aug. 16, 2016), available at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/dime (last visited July 3, 2017). 
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minority party commissioners are likely to sound a “fire alarm” if the majority on the 
commission embarks on a potentially controversial course of action.169 These “fire 
alarms” make it easier for lawmakers to keep an eye on agencies: Instead of 
reviewing every agency action individually, Congress can focus on instances in 
which minority party members dissent from a commission decision.170 Second, 
beyond simply sounding an alarm, minority commissioners might further reduce the 
costs of congressional oversight by providing lawmakers with information about the 
consequences of agency actions as well as ways to overturn those actions.171 Third, 
and relatedly, the same fire alarms that alert Congress to questionable commission 
decisions also alert the courts.172 This third mechanism can be considered as part of a 
multipronged strategy of congressional control: Congress creates agencies subject to 
PBRs; Congress also provides for judicial review of agency actions; and minority 
commissioners alert the courts to instances in which agency actions deviate from 
statutory directives. 
The monitoring account might lead us to expect that lawmakers would be 
most likely to impose PBRs when they are most worried about the executive branch 
straying from their own policy preferences. Consistent with this expectation, David 
Lewis observes that the percentage of new agencies with appointment limitations 
such as PBRs is highest in periods of divided government.173 Note, though, that 
while Lewis’s finding is consistent with the monitoring account, it does not confirm 
that account. Even if opposing party lawmakers seek to reduce monitoring costs by 
imposing PBRs on new multimember agencies, their efforts may prove fruitless.  
What we can say is that certain empirical findings make the monitoring 
account appear more plausible. For the monitoring account to be accurate, a 
                                                 
169 Barkow, supra note 87, at 41 (“[W]hen an agency is composed of members of different parties, it 
has a built-in monitoring system for interests on both sides because that type of body is more likely to 
produce a dissent if the agency goes too far in one direction. That dissent, in turn, serves as a ‘fire 
alarm’ that alerts Congress and the public at large that the agency’s decision might merit closer 
scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)). The origins of the “fire alarm” theory trace back to work by political 
scientists Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas 
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 
165 (1984).  
170 Alexander Bolton, Collegial Leadership Structures, Ideological Diversity, and Policymaking in the 
United States 12 (Aug. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript). 
171 Id. The presence of minority commissioners also may encourage majority commissioners to 
provide greater information than they otherwise would. Even the prospect of a dissent may serve an 
information-forcing function, compelling commissioners in the majority to provide more fulsome 
explanations for their decisions in an effort to dampen the potential dissenters’ fire alarm. Cf. 
Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of 
Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1589, 1605, 1657--60 (2014) (arguing that the prospect of 
inspector-general investigations, congressional hearings, or judicial review may compel agencies to 
provide better-reasoned explanations for their actions). 
172 Bolton, supra note 170, at 13. 
173 David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic 
Performance 54 (2008). 
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necessary but not sufficient condition is that PBRs actually lead to ideologically 
diverse agencies with minority members who will alert Congress and the courts if 
agency leaders stray from legislative preferences or statutory directives. In that 
respect, our finding that the ideological preferences of cross-party appointees in 
recent years have indeed diverged from the preferences of the appointing President 
supports the monitoring account’s claims. 
Importantly, however, the fact that PBRs produce ideological diversity on 
multimember agencies does not prove that PBRs succeed in reducing monitoring 
costs for Congress and the courts. First, members whose ideological preferences 
diverge from the White House occupant’s may still exhibit loyalty toward the 
President who appointed them. Lee Epstein and Eric Posner have documented a 
powerful “loyalty effect” among Supreme Court Justices, who are more likely to 
vote with the Solicitor General when the President who appointed them remains in 
office.174 This loyalty effect is distinct from the phenomenon of Supreme Court 
Justices tending to support the administration when the President is of the same party 
as the Justice’s appointer; the loyalty effect is person-specific rather than party-
specific. A similar loyalty effect among members of PBR agencies might lead a 
conservative Republican to support the policies of a Democratic President who 
appointed her (and likewise for a liberal Democrat appointed by a Republican 
President). A loyalty effect among cross-party appointees might undermine the 
monitoring value of ideological diversity at multimember agencies, because minority 
party members might be reluctant to interfere with the agenda of a President to 
whom they feel gratitude. 
Second, even in the absence of a loyalty effect, agency members whose 
ideological preferences diverge from the President’s might do little to reduce 
monitoring costs for Congress and the courts. Minority party members might be 
excluded from access to information about agency decisionmaking, or they might be 
reluctant to blow the whistle on their majority party colleagues, or their “fire alarms” 
might go unheeded by lawmakers and judges. Evaluating the strength of the 
monitoring account thus requires more than simply knowing how PBRs affect the 
ideological composition of multimember agencies. We would need to know whether 
the ideological composition of multimember agencies has observable effects on 
interactions between agencies and Congress, and between agencies and courts.175 
While the analysis above cannot answer all questions regarding the 
monitoring account’s accuracy, our topline results do provide guidance for 
researchers studying this subject. Most significantly, our findings suggest that the 
                                                 
174 Epstein & Posner, supra note 100.  
175 One of us has begun a project of using empirical methods to study the effectiveness of 
congressional oversight of administrative agencies. See Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the 
Administrative State, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943074. Studying the relationship between ideological composition and 
congressional oversight is a potentially fruitful path for future research. 
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effect of PBRs on monitoring costs may be time-variant: how PBRs affected 
interactions between agencies and Congress—and between agencies and courts—in 
the 1980s is not necessarily predictive with regard to later years. Our results suggest 
that the effects of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies 
from the Clinton presidency onward are quite unlike the effects under Presidents 
Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, and so the follow-on consequences for 
monitoring costs may be different for later periods than for earlier ones. 
 
B.  The Deliberative Account 
 
A second account of PBRs (which is distinct from, but not inconsistent with, 
the monitoring account above) draws from the social psychology literature on group 
polarization. Group polarization occurs “when an initial tendency of individual group 
members toward a given direction is enhanced following group discussion.”176 
Numerous studies have documented this phenomenon.177 Cass Sunstein, who is 
largely responsible for bringing the group polarization literature to the attention of 
administrative law scholars, highlights two explanations for the observed patterns of 
polarization. One emphasizes “social comparison”: people want to be perceived 
favorably by their peers, and so when surrounded by others with liberal 
(conservative) views, they will seek favor by adjusting their own views to be more 
liberal (conservative).178 A second explanation stresses “limited argument pools”: 
individuals are influenced by the arguments they encounter, and an individual 
confronted with only liberal (or only conservative) arguments is likely to move 
further in that direction. Both of these explanations might suggest that while 
individuals surrounded by others with likeminded views will grow more extreme, 
                                                 
176 Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. Personality & 
Soc. Psychol. 1141, 1141 (1986). 
177 Early experiments involved 18- and 19-year-old students in Paris who were asked about their 
attitudes toward France’s then-President, Charles de Gaulle, and about their attitudes toward the 
United States. Initial attitudes toward de Gaulle were “mildly favorable”; after group discussion, 
sentiments toward the President became even more favorable.177 Initial attitudes toward the United 
States were “mildly negative”; these views tended to become more negative following discussion. In 
both cases, group deliberation pushed group members toward the extreme. Roger Brown, Social 
Psychology 223--24 (2d ed. 1986). 
 In another study, subjects were presented with traffic felony scenarios and asked to rate 
defendants’ guilt (from “definitely not guilty” to “definitely guilty”). They then discussed their 
impressions and re-rated the defendants. The discussion process consistently led subjects to become 
more extreme in their views. With respect to scenarios in which most subjects initially considered the 
defendant to be guilty, group discussion strengthened their confidence in that view. When most 
subjects initially considered the defendant to be innocent, discussion likewise pushed subjects even 
further toward the innocence extreme. See David G. Myers & Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced 
Polarization in Simulated Juries, 2 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 63 (1976). 
178 Sunstein, supra note 13, at 88-89. 
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individuals exposed to a diversity of viewpoints may become more moderate.179 This 
diversity-leads-to-depolarization hypothesis draws some support in the social 
psychology literature, though this effect is stronger for group members confronting a 
problem for the first time than for group members dealing with familiar and much-
debated questions.180  
Sunstein argues that the social psychology literature on group polarization 
and depolarization produces potentially useful insights for agency design. “An 
independent agency that is all Democratic, or all Republican, might polarize toward 
an extreme position, likely more extreme than that of the median Democrat or 
Republican, and possibly more extreme than any member standing alone,” he 
writes.181 “A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check against 
movements of this kind.”182 The verbs “might” and “can” are important: 
extrapolations from laboratory experiments to the real world of multimember federal 
agencies raise questions of external validity. Moreover, even in the absence of PBRs, 
agency commissioners may be exposed to a rich pool of arguments from sources 
other than their colleagues. Commissioners likely encounter arguments from lawyers 
who practice before the agency, lobbyists who seek to influence agency action, think 
tanks inside the Beltway, and—on especially high-profile issues—news media. 
Nonetheless, the literature on group polarization offers a potential explanation as to 
how PBRs might affect agency decisionmaking. Here, as elsewhere, ideological 
diversity may depolarize.183 
Like the monitoring account, the deliberative account is difficult to verify 
directly. What we can say is that for the deliberative account to be accurate, it must 
first be the case that PBRs have the immediate effect of producing ideological 
diversity. In this respect, our findings are supportive of the deliberative account. 
                                                 
179 Id. at 89, 118--19. 
180 See Brown, supra note 177, at 226. 
181 See Sunstein, supra note 178, at 103.  
182 Id. In a similar vein, Rachel Barkow writes: 
 
[A] partisan balance requirement . . . can avoid extremely partisan decisions . . . . As a wealth 
of empirical research demonstrates, a group composed solely of ideologically like-minded 
people tends toward extreme decision making. Liberals and conservatives alike become more 
liberal and conservative, respectively, when they deliberate only with likeminded people. . . . 
[A] commission of five members all of the same party would be even more polarized than 
one in which a bare majority is of the same party. 
 
Barkow, supra note 87, at 40-41. 
183 To be sure, partisan balance requirements theoretically could have the opposite effect. Considering 
the possibility of partisan balance requirements for judicial panels, Cass Sunstein and Tom Miles note 
that “[p]erhaps both Republican and Democratic appointees would conceive of themselves, to a 
somewhat greater degree, as political partisans, simply because the requirement of mixed composition 
would suggest as much.” Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 
Duke L.J. 2193, 2228 (2009). 
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Increasing party polarization appears to have the perhaps-unexpected effect of 
increasing the ideological heterogeneity of multimember agencies. No longer do 
Democratic Presidents fill seats on boards and commissions with likeminded liberals 
who differ only in their party registration. No longer do Republican Presidents stock 
multimember agencies with conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans. 
Instead, we observe PBRs leading to multimember agencies with a mix of liberal 
Democratic and conservative Republican members. 
That members are afforded opportunities to deliberate is a second necessary 
condition for the deliberative account. If decisions are preordained based on the 
views of the chair or those of an autonomous professional staff, with the 
multimember structure merely serving as a rubber stamp, then deliberation either 
will not occur or will be irrelevant to policy outcomes. Although the evidence is 
limited, we think this second condition is indeed met at most multimembers 
agencies. Commissioners are generally able to hire their own dedicated staff, and 
thus have the capacity to critically evaluate proposals from the chair or others and to 
suggest informed alternatives.184 Moreover, most multimember agencies are required 
to undertake official action only at or after a formal meeting with a quorum, which 
affords at least an opportunity to deliberate.185 
But even assuming that these preconditions are met—namely, that PBRs 
foster ideological diversity and that members have opportunities to deliberate—it 
does not necessarily follow that deliberation actually occurs, much less that minds 
are changed. The question of whether ideological diversity on multimember agencies 
has any effect on decisional outputs still remains unanswered. But while we do not 
seek to answer that question here, we believe that it may be possible in future 
research to assess the deliberative account in further detail. For example, one might 
ask whether agencies that are more ideologically diverse are also less likely to be 
reversed by courts, or less likely to commit “infractions” of other kinds (i.e., actions 
that elicit criticism from inspectors general, the Government Accountability Office, 
or major newspapers).186 One might also look at whether ideological diversity on 
multimember agencies affects voting patterns of individual agency members. 
Analogously, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have found evidence suggesting that 
on three-member circuit court panels, the presence of an ideological minority has a 
moderating effect on the votes of judges in the majority.187 Richard Revesz has 
documented a similar phenomenon in environmental law cases decided by the D.C. 
                                                 
184 See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1168 (2000) (describing members’ ability to 
select and supervise their own staffs). 
185 See id. at 1236--94 (listing meeting requirements). 
186 On the measurement of agency “infractions,” see Feinstein, supra note 175, at 24--25. 
187 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (2006). 
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Circuit.188 While these authors use party affiliation as a proxy for ideology, our 
approach of using appointees’ campaign contributions can allow for a richer analysis 
of ideological diversity and depolarization in the agency context. Down the road, we 
hope to examine whether ideologically diversity leads agency members to gravitate 
together or pull apart. 
 
C.  The Obstruction Account 
 
 A third and final perspective on partisan balance requirements posits that 
PBRs unconstitutionally interfere with presidential control over the executive 
branch. The Justice Department under President George H.W. Bush made a brief 
argument to this effect in a 1989 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum: according 
to the memo, PBRs violate Article II’s Appointments Clause189 because “[t]he only 
congressional check that the Constitution places on the President’s power to appoint 
‘principal officers’ is the advice and consent of the Senate.”190 The Office of Legal 
Counsel listed PBRs as one of “ten types of legislative provisions commonly 
included in proposed legislation that weaken the Presidency” and that the executive 
branch should “consistently and forcefully resist[].”191 
A more full-throated version of this argument emerges from recent work by 
Ronald Krotoszynski and coauthors. Krotoszynski et al. rely on the Supreme Court’s 
2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board,192 a case involving a five-member board created to regulate auditing of 
securities issuers. While the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
is not subject to a PBR, its members were protected by “dual for-cause removal 
limitations”: they could be removed only by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and only for cause, and the SEC commissioners could be removed by 
the President only for cause.193 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, 
                                                 
188 Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 
(1997). 
189 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all . . . Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”). 
190 Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
248, 250 (July 27, 1989).  
191 Id. at 248. In a separate vein, law professor Jamin Raskin has argued that PBRs violate the First 
Amendment and the principle of equal protection because they discriminate on the basis of party 
affiliation. See Jamin B. Raskin, “A Complicated and Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election 
Commission Unconstitutionally Composed?, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 609 (2000). 
192 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
193 The SEC’s organic statute actually imposes no limitation on the removal of commissioners. 
However, the parties in Free Enterprise Fund both agreed that SEC commissioners are protected by 
an unwritten for-cause removal limitation. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487. 
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held that “the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board members 
contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers.”194 But the opinion arguably 
stands for the broader proposition that the President must have “meaningful 
oversight and control powers over independent agencies.”195 
Krotoszynski and coauthors argue that PBRs, when coupled with for-cause 
removal limitations for agency members, potentially violate the broader separation-
of-powers principle embodied in the Free Enterprise Fund decision. They write: 
 
Statutory partisan balance requirements quite literally force Presidents to rely on 
political enemies to carry out their executive duties. . . . This is especially troubling 
considering the increased polarization present in American political parties. . . . 
Essentially, statutory partisan balance requirements foster a politically polarizing 
environment at the heads of independent agencies. . . . [T]hese statutory partisan 
balance requirements force Presidents to carry out their executive duties with 
contentious and highly polarized agency heads . . . [and] preclude a President from 
appointing a sufficient number of agency commissioners in agreement with her 
political philosophy to overcome the debilitating effect of partisanship.196 
 
 Notably, Krotoszynski and coauthors do not claim that PBRs are always 
unconstitutional. They write: “If Congress requires the President to appoint political 
opponents to an independent federal agency, but does not also entrench such persons 
with a fixed term of office or good cause protection against removal, it is difficult to 
see how a partisan balance requirement on these facts would significantly impede the 
President’s ability to oversee and direct the agency’s operations.”197 In their view, it 
is the combination of PBRs and for-cause removal protections, rather than either of 
these provisions individually, that render a large swath of administrative agencies 
unconstitutional. They conclude: “Congress should have the choice of mandating 
partisan balance requirements or insulating principal officers who serve on agency 
heads from removal; it should not be permitted to impose both conditions 
concurrently.”198 
 There is, on reflection, something curious about the claim that for-cause 
removal protections are constitutionally allowable but that the combination of PBRs 
and removal protections raises problems. Consider the case of the SEC, a five-
member body whose commissioners serve staggered five-year terms, with one term 
ending in June of every year.199 Suppose there were no PBR and so a two-term 
President (say, President Obama) would have opportunities to fill every position on 
the commission. Assuming that President Obama could get all of his nominees 
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confirmed, he would be able to stock the commission with likeminded members 
during his eight years in office (indeed, by year five). President Trump would then 
inherit an SEC with five liberal Democratic commissioners. Each June, President 
Trump would be able to appoint a conservative Republican to the expiring term, but 
it would not be until June 2019—more than halfway through his firm term—that he 
could achieve a conservative Republican majority on the SEC. 
 At least arguably, partisan balance requirements make Presidents less 
“rel[iant] on political enemies” insofar as they ensure that Presidents inherit 
commissions with only a bare majority of members hailing from the opposite party. 
In the example above, President Trump would be able to achieve a conservative 
Republican majority on the SEC the first time that a Democratic-appointed 
commissioner’s term expires. In an analysis of 12 multimember agencies subject to 
PBRs, Neil Devins and David Lewis find that following a change in party control of 
the White House, it takes an average of 13 to 14 months for the new President to 
obtain a majority of co-partisans on a commission.200 In other words, if historical 
patterns hold, it will take President Trump an average of 13 to 14 months from 
inauguration—March or April of 2018—before a majority of commissioners are 
Republican. By contrast, it takes an average of 26 months for a new President to 
appoint an absolute majority of members (i.e., until March of 2019 before a majority 
of commissioners are Trump appointees).201 
 Thus, the extent to which PBRs make a President reliant on commissioners 
whose ideologies differ from the President’s own views depends critically on 
whether PBRs actually push Democratic Presidents to appoint conservative 
Republicans (and, vice versa, whether PBRs actually push Republican Presidents to 
appoint liberal Democrats). If PBRs impose only a weak constraint, such that a 
Democratic President can appoint liberals to both Democratic and Republican seats, 
then it will take longer for a new conservative Republican President to fill a 
commission with conservatives. If PBRs impose a stronger constraint on ideology, 
then a new conservative Republican President will be able to assemble conservative 
majorities on commissions much more quickly. From this perspective, our results 
should be reassuring to those who worry that multimember agencies subject to PBRs 
whose members enjoy for-causal removal protection will interfere with the 
President’s pursuit of his or her policy agenda. As PBRs become increasingly 
effective at generating ideological diversity on multimember agencies, they may in 
fact do less to obstruct the sitting President rather than more. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our topline result can be summarized in a single sentence: Since the mid-
1990s (but not in the decade and a half before), partisan balance requirements have 
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shaped the ideological composition of multimember agencies by forcing Presidents 
to fill cross-party seats with appointees whose preferences diverge from their own. In 
other words, partisan balance requirements indeed bite, but they have come to do so 
only relatively recently. These findings are broadly consistent with supply-side 
developments: as ideology and party identification have become more closely 
correlated, Presidents have found it more difficult to identify competent cross-party 
appointees whose policy preferences they share. And as a consequence, the decades-
long trend toward partisan sort in American politics has led to multimember boards 
and commissions comprised of very few cross-party appointees sharing the ideology 
of the President who appointed them. Democratic Presidents may still be on the hunt 
for liberal Republicans to appoint to cross-party seats (and Republican Presidents for 
conservative Democrats), but with fewer of these creatures left in the wild, 
Presidents increasingly are compelled to select their ideological opponents for cross-
party seats. 
Our results suggest a novel twist on the standard narrative of partisan 
polarization. The conventional wisdom holds that increased partisan polarization has 
strained the architecture of government. At agencies subject to PBRs, however, the 
effects of partisan sort may be salutary. Partisan sort may lead Presidents to select 
bona fide cross-party members, who in turn serve as in-house monitors and 
counterbalance tendencies that might drive groups to go to extremes.  
We cannot yet say definitively that PBRs reduce the costs borne by Congress 
and the courts in watching over multimember agencies. Nor can we confidently say 
that PBRs improve deliberative processes inside agencies. This study is a first step 
toward resolving those questions, but it is not a final answer. What we can conclude, 
based on the data analyzed here, is that PBRs appear to enhance the ideological 
diversity of multimember boards and commissions throughout the federal 
bureaucracy. At a time of heightened concerns regarding partisan polarization in 
Washington and across the country, that in itself is no mean feat. 
 
 
 
 
